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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XXI JUNE, 1952 NUMBER 2
CATHOLIC POLITEIA I
JOSEPH F. COSTANZO, S-J.t
N a previous article we studied the Graeco-Roman Politeia and
our analysis disclosed some of the positive and genuine contributions
of Western antiquity to the art of governance and, in the same appraisal,
revealed the radical deficiencies inherent in the total preoccupation
with the founding of a self-sufficient secular order. We observed that
for want of those reservations which guarantee the connatural freedom
which individuals have antecedent and superior to civic prescriptions,
the ever mounting cumulative demands exacted in the name of the
numerous gods and of the patria potestas operated with inevitable logic
to an ever more stringent paralyzing restraint upon individual initiative
and gradually sapped the pristine vigor of the Roman citizenry. The
politeia had been suffering for four centuries from chronic debility, and
nothing which political activity could achieve seemed capable of restor-
ing its original vigor. The constructive genius of Caesar and Augustus
culminated in the Pax Roman-a and achieved in concrete expression
Virgil's City of Men. But the Augustan era was but the prelude to the
breakdown of the Imperium in the third century. The collapse of the
respublica was indeed successfully forestalled by the vigorous administra-
tive genius of various principates and their multiple genuine projects
of reform. But the "inner life" had long gone out of the Colossus and
the sack of Rome disclosed only too patently the futility of the hopes
entertained by the renovationist emperors from Constantine to Theo-
dosius.
The Fall of Rome was the fall of an idea, or rather of a system of
life based upon a complex of ideas. The core of the Graeco-Roman
Politeia was the supposition that mankind by reason of a capacity in-
herent in itself possesses the ability to discover a good independent
of that which is intrinsic to a created being, and to generate the impulse
needed for its realization. The politeia bound the Ultimate Good
within this and the only (temporal) existence of man and devised its
concrete embodiment through a creative politics in a wholly self-sufficient
' Lecturer in Philosophy and Political Philosophy, Fordham University.
1. See Costanzo, Graeco-Roman Politeia, 20 FoRD. L. Rzv. 119 (19S).
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secular social order. The classical idea of a good life through knowledge
(which Pelagius was to incorporate into his heresy) was wholly illusory.
A process through education, either as intellectual discipline or moral
habituation or both, cannot but lead to the deceptive and flattering ideal
in utter disregard of the sobering fact of historical experience, that
man cannot attain felicity in a mere world-immanent concept and
endeavor. Born of Greek intellectualism and Roman voluntarism, and
tempered by the turbulent experiments of the polis and the more
enduring results of Roman statecraft, the politeia depended for its
survival on a number of arbitrary identifications-religion, morals,
politics, the immanent cosmic reason equated subjectively to "mind",
power with nature, and the Ultimate Good with the life of the City.
Not till the Advent of Christianity were philosophers and statesmen
able to correlate the valid claims of authority and the inviolable pre-
rogatives of the individual. Freedom was not less but better secured
through subjection to authority, and authority stripped of its pretensions
to absolutism was recognized by reason of its divine origin to be suffused
with a nobler content and more august responsibility.
"The liberties of the ancient nations were crushed beneath a hopeless and in.
evitable despotism, and their vitality was spent, when the new power came forth from
Gallilee, giving what was wanting to the efficacy of human knowledge to redeem
societies as well as men .... When Christ said: 'Render unto Caesar the things that
are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's,' those words spoken on His
last visit to the Temple, three days before His death, gave to the Civil power, under
the protection of conscience, a sacredness it had never enjoyed, and bounds it
had never acknowledged; and they were the repudiation of absolutism and the
inaugural of freedom. For Our Lord not only delivered the precept, but created
the force to execute it. To maintain the necessary immunity in the one supreme
sphere, to reduce all political authority within defined limits, ceased to be an
aspiration of patient reasoners, and was made the perpetual charge of the most
energetic institution and the most universal association in the world. The new law,
the new spirit, the new authority, gave liberty a meaning and value it had not
possessed in the philosophy or in the constitution of Greece or Rome before the
knowledge of the truth that makes us free." 2
The Resurrection of Christ, Our Lord, the guarantee and warrantor
of Eternal Life to those who receive Him and become sons of God,
was the deathblow of secular aspirations and ideals. Man was to be
liberated from his Promethean captivity by confessing to his complete
dependence upon a loving and provident God-adhaerere Deo-of cleav-
ing to the Supreme Good which is extrinsic to our merely human nature.
This is the Creative Truth which would set all men free and provide
fresh foundations for a new science of politics.
2. AcToN, HISTORY or FEDom ESSAYS 27-9 (1922).
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The establishment and expanding growth of the early Christian Church
within the Roman Empire would for manifold historic reasons un-
avoidably confront the two in mutual conflicting claims. In the early
centuries, the Fathers of the Church were content to affirm the exigencies
of the Christian conscience and the prerogative rights of the Divinely
instituted Church against the omnicompetent pretentions of the pagan
state. But, with the exception of Lactantius, the first Christian philos-
ophers had not yet evolved a philosophical ethics, and, not till St.
Isidore, was some sort of a moral theology formulated with direct rapport
toward the civil powers. We must, however, allow for the historical
contingencies wherein the early Fathers and Christian apologists did
not enjoy the leisure and the theological security of the Schoolmen to
attend to the formidable problem of State and Church relations. The
weight of their preoccupations engaged them otherwise. The trinitarian
controversies, the Christological problems, the great heresies ever re-
curring sufficed to absorb the greater part of their activity.
The first direct assault on the idealistic pretentions of the pagan
politeia was made by one who deeply revered the magnificence of the
historic role of Rornanitas and who could in the expanding vision of the
Divine Faith apply the full power of his acute ingenium to a penetrating
analysis of the pagan assumptions and claims. St. Augustine undertook
to break through the confined frontiers of pagan naturalism and dissipate
the nightmare involved in the concept of nature as a closed system of
orderly relations determined by its own exclusive laws by fixing the
principle of sufficiency and the source of all actuality, truth and value
in an extra-temporal, transcendental Divine Reality and in the communion
of divine charity.
"To be wise and live in the truth is to love God. Therefore 'thou shalt love the
Lord Thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole
mind; and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.' Natural philosophy is here, since
all the causes of all natural things are in God the Creator, Ethics is here, since
a good and honest life is not formed otherwise than by loving, as they should
be loved, those things which we ought to love; namely, God and our neighbor.
Logic is here, since God alone is the truth and the light of the rational soul Here,
too, is laudable security for the commonwealth; for a state is neither founded
nor preserved save in the foundation and by the bond of faith and of firm concord
when the highest common good is loved by all, and this highest and truest being is
eGod; when, too, men love one another in Rim with absolute simplicity; since
they love one another for His sake, from whom they cannot hide the real character
of love."3
St. Augustine was the first of the fathers who attempted to draw up
a doctrine of the state in his monumental opus, the City of God. Both
3. E is Ao CXXXVII, c. V, 17.
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St. Augustine and the pagans were at one in the comprehensiveness of
viewpoint-sub specie aeternitatis. But they differ radically in establish-
ing their vantage point and, as a consequence, they diverged essentially
in their perspective. But even before St. Augustine began the composition
of the City of God in 413, he had traced the flaws of Roman society to
the acceptance of a defective arche'. He implied that what was needed
to rehabilitate the system was the radical revision of first principles;
and this he proposed to his countrymen as the real fulfillmelit of the
Roman aspiration for an everlasting city. What was needed was Chris-
tianity with its regenerative principles of God, men, and the universe, to
reinvigorate the life of the State with her new doctrine of justice and
order resting on a divinely revealed law of love. It is possible to en-
visage the world in either of two ways, with or without the eyes of a
Christian, the results in each case being apparent. To the creative
politics of an intellectual or voluntaristic rationalism, St. Augustine
answered:
"The good that must be sought for the soul is not one above which it is to fly
by judging, but to which it is to cleave by loving; and what can this be except
God? Not the good mind, or the good angel, or the good Heaven, but the good
good.P4
The sack of Rome by Alaric on the 24th of August, 410 shocked the
known world. History has drawn a veil over the horrors of that un-
exampled catastrophe; we know of it chiefly from the sensation it
caused in distant places-such as is reported in the writings of St.
Jerome. The eternity of Rome had been a presupposition of the
common consciousness. For the pagan Roman, the city of Augustan
splendor had preserved unimpaired her architectural dignity through
the many factions that had divided and weakened the Empire. The gods
of fortune and war, of glory and peace, still ringed the seven hills. The
likenesses of the Caesars and their temples still kept before the eyes
of the Romans the imposing accomplishments of their people; and the
addition of the Syrian gods who had adulterated the traditional Roman
cult was a reminder of the Roman universality that extended with its
far flung conquests. The Pax Romana ruled a universe and the eastern
people welcomed her generals as divine deliverers from the anarchy of
local rule. To the Christian, Rome was a symbol of the universality,
of the Church and Her eternal mission. Churches of Saints and mounds
of martyrs ever looked with a deep sense of enduring victory to the
catacombs that underlined the outskirts of the city. Yet Rome was
still a fairly pagan city when she saw Alaric within her walls. The sack
4. DE TanmITA'rE Bk. V, c. III, VII, 205 (Dod's transi.).
[Vol. 21
CATHOLIC POLITEIA I
of Rome could not but be the judgment of Jove. The mad policy of
the Emperors in prohibiting sacrifices to the gods has produced its in-
evitable nemesis.5
Augustine answered the pagans with his opus magnum, Tke City of
God. Its object, as indicated by the author himself, was twofold. Begun
in 413, three years after the sack of Rome by Alaric, it was designed
in the first instance "to refute those who, contending that the Christian
religion was responsible for the overthrow of Rome, began to blaspheme
the true God with even more than their habitual bitterness and virulence."
From this standpoint it expanded into a general assault upon the philo-
sophic foundations of pagan "eternity," in other words upon the claims
of Virgil's City of Men. The inherent deficiencies of pagan achievement
are analyzed by one who had traversed in full cycle an intellectual
odyssey from boyhood Christianity to morbid Manichaeism, Stoicism,
Academic scepticism, Neo-Platonism, and finally to the Divine Revela-
tion of Christian Truth.
I. ST. AUGUSTINE AND THE PAGAN POLITEIA
It may seem astounding to the modem mind that St. Augustine should
find the basic answer to the problem of the social order in the Christian
Revelation of Divine Love. St. Augustine taught that every human
society finds its constituent principle in a common will, a will to life,
a will to enjoyment, above all a will to peace. The last word is not
with the mind, buf with what one loves. The will is the faculty of affection-
ate pursuit after that happiness which can give it lasting peace. To
St. Augustine forms of government are irrelevant; what matters is that
the moral quality of the State draws upon the morals of the citizens
who compose the State. He defines a people as a "multitude of rational
creatures associated in a common agreement as to the things which it
loves." Hence in order to see what people are like we must consider the
objects of their love. If the society is associated in a love of that which
is good, it will be a good society; if the object of its love is evil, it will
be bad.7 And thus the moral law of the individual and social life are
5. The conflicting theological positions of the Christians and the pagans on the fortunes
of war is acutely illustrated by the alternating removal and restoration of the Altar of
Victory which Augustus had installed in the Senate to symbolize the victorious fortunes of
the Roman Empire.
6. Id., c. X.X, 24.
7. GILSON, INTRODUCTION A L'ETuDE D- SAnT Aucusri 222 (1929): "Les hommes
.. . sont leurs volont~s, c'est & dire leurs amours; on pourrait dire aussi, tel amour, tel
peuple, car si l'amour est le lien constitutif de la cit6, c'est--dire de l. soc!,t il suffit
de savoir ce qu'un peuple aime pour savoir ce qu'il est: ut videatur qualis quisque popkdus
sit, al sunt intuenda quae diligit."
1952]
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the same, since both to the city and to the individual we can apply the
same principle-non faciunt bonos vel malos mores nisi boni vel mali
amores. From this standpoint the quality of any community may be
measured in terms of the objects of its desires. The two great civitates
of St. Augustine's vision are distinguished by two loves and their
respective desires. Professor Arnold Toynbee in his monumental Study
of History perceives clearly in the distinction which differentiates the
two commonwealths that which seems to have escaped those historians
and political scientists who have followed the lead of A. J. Carlyle.'
It may be noted that in this passage Saint Augustine starts from a
premise which is common to him and to the philosophers, but that he
arrives at a conclusion which is the opposite to theirs. The philosophers,
too, condemn and reject love of mundane things; but they infer, from
their unfavorable experience of Love when it is directed towards one
particular kind of object, that Love itself is a spiritual infirmity which
the sage must make up his mind to pluck out and cast from him, on the
reckoning that it is profitable for him to be without the faculty of
Love rather than to renounce the possibility of attaining that absolute
Detachment which, in the judgment of a philosophically enlightened
understanding, is the only complete cure for a spiritual malady that
consists in the very fact of being alive. The philosopher arrives at this
radical conclusion because he does not take the precaution, which Saint
Augustine does take, of looking into his premises before proceeding to
argue from it; and the philosopher therefore overlooks the capital point
that Love in vacuo is a logical abstraction which is morally neutral
(adiaphoron in the Stoic terminology), while the moral character of real
love in action is determined by the nature of the object towards which
it is directed. On this criterion the condemnation of the Love of the
creature is a right moral judgment; but the correct inference from it is
not that Love itself is bad, but that the proper object of Love is not
the creature but the Creator?
If you must achieve, it is not enough to know; knowledge must be re-
inforced by love. And human history has a meaning because it forms a
8. 1 CARL'LE, A HISTORY OF PoUT cA. THEoRy n; TrE WEST 166 (1903): "A State may
be more or less corrupt, but so long as it consists of a multitude of rational beings asso-
dated together in the harmonious enjoyment of that which they love, St. Augustine thinks
it may be regarded as a State of a Commonwealth. This is practically Cicero's definition,
but with the elements of law and justice left out. No more fundamental difference could
very well be imagined although St. Augustine seems to take the matter lightly; for Cicero's
whole conception of the State runs upon this principle, that it is a means for attaining
and preserving justice." (Italics mine.)




part of a great providence which was conceived when time was not and
shall be consummated when time is no more. Human history is not, as
Stoics thought, a cyclic recurrence; 10 human history has a goal and its
destiny is governed by the law of its love.n That is the thought which lies
at the heart of the City of God. What role has God in His giniversal
providence assigned to the State as a positive agency for realizing tit
Kingdom of God on earth and serve the purposes of the City of Goad
toward eternity? In St. Augustine's answer is the real fulfillment of the
Roman aspiration of "eternity."
"And so he (Augustine) sets before us a philosophy of History-the continuous
evolution of the Divine purpose in human society; he contrasts the earthly politics
which change and pass with the eternal City of God which is being manifested in
the world: he shows how these two are intermingled, interacting now, but how
different they are in their real nature: one is of the earth, centered only in earthly
things, while the other, because it has its chief regard fixed on that which is Eternal,
gives us the best rule for the things of time. The earthly city which aimed only
at earthly prosperity failed to attain even that, while the Heavenly City, aiming
at an Eternal Peace, supplies the best conditions for earthly good as well. It is
in the hope of the final triumph of the City of God, that the course of the world
becomes intelligible, for then we may see that the rise and fall of earthly empires,
the glories of ancient civilization, the sufferings of men in their ruin, have not been
unmeaning or in vain; for they have served to prepare for the coming of the king-
dom of God.'- 2
The City of God is an ethico-theological apologetic of the Christian
insertion of the divine action in the world and consequently of a supra-
rational historical finalism in counterpoint to the politejd as a reality
existing by itself, autonomous, irreducible to anything but itself. It ac-
cepts the pale aspirations and the desperate strivings of Virgil's City of
Men and annexes them to a transcendental and absolute principle
moving towards a transcendental and absolute end while actualizing at
the same time sound and legitimate human development. It infuses the
virtues of the City of God into the City of Men without tragically con-
founding the two. From these lofty yet immanent perspectives St.
Augustine provides us sub specie aeternitatis (and therefore on the higher
level of principles) a fresh foundation for a new polity. In addition,
we excerpt disperate passages from De Libero Arbitrio, Confessiones, and
De Doctrina Christiana with a more direct and immediate rapport with
10. I S RTnLANGEs, Lz CmamsNx ET -us PmwosoPxns 50-I.
11. Gmnso-o, op. cit. supra note 7, at 221: "Ces deux cits une fois conques sans leur
essence pure, la philosophie morale va s'panouir en philosophic de l'histolre, discemer sous
la multiplidt6 des peuples et des 6viaements la per-istance des deux cit6s depuls le
dibut du monde et degagner la loi qui permet d'en prisager le destin."
12. Cuxxin;GHAa!, ST. ArGusTn= AND HIs PLACE 22i TE HISTOnY or CmusuTv;
THOUGHT 114 (1886).
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the temporal order. Out of the polemic against the Graeco-Roman secu-
larism, issued forth a body of positive moral, social, and philosophic
doctrine, which (as we shall see as the larger argumentum of this article)
will for centuries to come provide the lay and religious leaders and
makers of Christendom with the inner core of a Christian polity. For
our immediate purpose we have selected four radical enigmas of the
politeia and inquired what principles, if any, St. Augustine offered for
their resolution. The first serious flaw of the politeia was the paralyzing
conception of justice as a universal, eternal, immutable, and objective
due order whose correlative was rigidly actualized (or to be actualized)
in the cosmopolis. At its best, this cosmological necessitarianism
presaged the Augustan Eternal Law; at its worst, for want of a valid
theology and adequate metaphysics, it arrested the juridical order into
immobility. Secondly, the resultant tension of the divine investiture of
the temporal (expressed in one form in the civil legislative plenary
powers of the Pontifex Maximus) was resolved by St. Augustine with a
dynamic conception of a variable temporal law which imparts to the
dynamic variants of time and change meaning and values born of human
exigencies and conditioned by historical contingencies. The legitimacy-
rather the justification-of changes rests on the conformity not the iden-
tity of the temporal with the eternal law and in this wise secures the
permanence of virtue in the process of amendment. To date, this was
the most refreshing answer to the Greek dread of the stasis and the re-
current Roman revolutionary upheavals. Thirdly, to the pagan concept
and actual assumption of plenary power as absolute and unlimited, St.
Augustine responded with the only valid credentials for the exercise of
authority over fellow-equals-the consent of the governed understood
in the light of their personal transcendence. Fourthly, to the pagan
aspiration for a creative politics, St. Augustine provided the doctrine of
sound human nature as the essential prerequisite to a just social order.
In the first part of this article, we will summarily review these four
central doctrinal theses of St. Augustine and weigh their significant rele-
vance to any sound polity. In the second part, we will take the measure
of St. Augustine's influence in the general scenery of history as a grow-
ing and expanding tradition in the historical genesis of political thought
and in the institutional embodiments of that tradition. With due regard
to both orders of actualities and thought, we will select evidences of the
Augustinian tradition on four levels-the higher level of principle as in-
stanced in the writings of St. Isidore of Seville, Jonas of Orleans, and
Hincmar of Rheims-on the experient level of juridical embodiment,
such, for example, as the Law of the Visigoths, the Carolingian Capitt-
laria, and the Assizes of Jerusalem-on the level of legal doctrine as
[Vol. 21
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expressed by the Feudal lawyers, Bracton and Beaumanoir-and
fourthly, on the level of political philosophy as evolved by John of Salis-
bury and St. Thomas Aquinas. In a subsequent article we will consider
the resurgence of Roman Law in the historic Reception on the Continent
and the survival and triumph of the Christian polity in Catholic Eng-
land. And in conclusion, we will then trace the logical and historical
consequences of the Augustinian-Isidorian-Thomistic tradition in the de-
velopment of constitutionalism through representative government as
evolved first in the religious orders and then in civil society.
1. The Augustan Eternal Law and the Liberation from
Monistic Naturalism
When Plato sought to define and determine the ideal of justice, he
thought of it in terms of geometry and described it as "geometrical
equality." Since geometry signified for Plato eternal and immutable
verities, the inference was drawn by analogy that the ethical laws of
justice have neither beginning nor change. This conception of an eter-
nal and impersonal law, which was inherited and assimilated by the
Roman Stoics into their Cosmic Reason was, however disguised or in-
terpreted, utterly unacceptable and incomprehensible to the Christian
Augustine. The law of Revelation, Mosaic and Christian, presupposes a
personal lawgiver, who reveals the law and guarantees its truth, validity,
and its authority; it cannot otherwise but be an intellectual standard,
a measure (a metric ratio) of activity, without moral sanction to justify
compulsory submission binding in conscience. For want of a trans-
cendent theology and a metaphysics of the will, the ancients were ar-
rested by virtue of their excessive and disjunctive intellectualism and
voluntarism into a necessitarian monism. The philosophic process by
which St. Augustine broke out of the all inclusive system of nature was
as follows:
With Socratic intuition he maintains that self-knowledge is the first
and indispensable step toward Truth.13 But in order to find an un-
changeble, absolute truth, man must go beyond the limit of his con-
sciousness and his own contingent existence. Whereas the ancients failed
to seize upon the significance of the mutable not only as a point of de-
parture but as a necessary term of relation to the immutable, St. Au-
13. "Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas," Da A RE-
IaGiOUS c. XXXIX, 72. This is entirely in the spirit of Greek and Roman raY'sacal tra-
dition. But after that there follow the words that mark the sharp difference. "Si tuum
naturam mutabilem invereris, transcende it te ipsum . . . illuc tende, unde ipsum lumen
rationis ascenditur." By this transcendence the whole method of Greek dialectic is
changed. Reason surrenders its self-sufficiency.
1952]
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gustine proceeded from one to the other through the mediacy of man,
denying neither meaning to time and change nor compromising immu-
table eternal verities. God has given to man that he "holds a middle
place between the unchangeable Truth above him and the changeable
things beneath him,"' 4 that he "should live according to his own nature
...namely, under Him to Whom he ought to be subject, and above
those things to which he is 'preferred; under Him by Whom he ought
to rule with reason."'5 This order is governed by the Eternal Law, which
is separate from the nature whose exemplar it is (against the Stoics);
it is the mind of the Supreme Divine Personal God for only thus can
it yield the laws for men, norms to which, in the very nature of being,
the human mind is bound to subscribe. But while transcending human
reason, it must not be either beyond reach, like Plato's "pattern laid up
in heaven," nor yet esoteric, accessible only to the moral and intellec-
tual superior man or charismatic leader. It must be immanent in man
in the sense that he has the intellectual ability to discern a law obli-
gating him in conscience.
"The assimilation of the Greek idea of beauty to Christian morals was effected
by St. Augustine, De div. quaest. 83, qu. 30. What is especially to be noted in
Augustine's text, is the transformation imposed on the idea of virtue, on which
alone the Ancients based their morals. For Cicero, virtue is the honestum and vice
versa: and this for him is sufficient. For the Christians, virtue is still the hovestum
and, as such, is distinguished from the utile (what is desirable, not for its own
sake, but as a means to something else); only, the whole order of the utile hence-
forth includes all that divine providence had disposed in view of the supreme
end, and the honestum is that which is to be enjoyed (fri not uti-utile), but not
used, that is to say, God. Thus Cicero's' virtues are always honestum but hence-
forth wisdom, fortitude, justice and temperance are virtues because they pertain
to a soul that rejoices in God, and makes use of all the rest in view of God:
neque enim ad aliquid aliud Deus referendus est (loc. cit.). If then the virtues
are to be desired propter se (op. cit., qu. 31, 2) it is not because they suffice, or
suffice for us, for to the Christian they come from God and lead to God, which is
the reason why they are good: 'Quid ergo? Jam constitutis ante oculos nostros tribus,
Epicureo, Stoico, Christiano, interrogemus singulos. Dic Epicuree, quae res faciat
beatum? Respondet: voluptas corporis. Dic, Stoice, Virtus animi. Dic Christiane.
Donem Dei . . . .Magna res, Laudabilis res: lauda Stoice, quantum potes; sed dic,
unde habes? Non virtus animi tui te facit beatum, sed quod tibi virtutem dedit, qui
tibi velle inspiravit, et posse donavit.' (Sermo 150, 7, 8-8, 9). This text not only
affirms the necessity of grace, which does not appertain to the philosophical ordir,
but also marks that virtue, of which the seeds lie in us naturally (De div. quaest.
83, 31, 1), depends on God and grace not only as regards its efficacy, but also as
regards its existence and worth, since God is both its principle and end; non virtus
animi tui te fecit beatum, sed qui tibi virtutem dedit. As the supreme moral value
Christianity replaces virtue by God, and the moral end is thereby transformed." 10
14. Da DocraA CMUSTLAP7A II, 28, 57.
15. DE TRIUTATE X, 5, 7.
16. GtasoN, THE SPIRIT Op MEDIzVAL P LOsOPHY 473 n. 4 (1931). (Italics mine.)
[Vol. 21
CATHOLIC POLITEIA I
Thus did St. Augustine achieve on the ground of reason a departure
from the moral naturalism of the pagans.1 7 By his insistence upon the
eternal law as transcendent, he freed men's minds and wills from the
fatalism inherent in Stoic pan-naturalism. For by vindicating the dis-
tinctness of human reason from the Mind of God, he saved the will by
imparting to it that element of rationality without which it must degen-
erate into mere subjective willfulness or passive acceptance of the
course of Nature. St. Augustine was completely dominated by the idea
of the Eternal Law, which he describes as the ultimate pattern of all
law,"8 as the ratio divina et voluntas Dei ordinem naturalem conservari
iubens, perturbari vetans.'9 Throughout the whole of the City of God,
the Pax which is to characterize all life, is the direct product of order;
an objective due order apprehended by reason and with which will, in
making its fiats of law, must be squared; for laws exist only ut omnia
sint ordinatissi ma. Because the law is made manifest by a freely crea-
tive act of God, voluntas Dei is conceived as consequent to His reason,
and so the law of God is not arbitrary but just for He commands what
is in accord with His Divine essence. And as its counterpart human
law, from jussus, a mere command of the will, becomes an ordinatio
rationis. Thus Reason as a flickering immanent principle has become
law as the expression of a transcendent Will. The importance of St.
Augustine's eternal law in political thought is that it supplies us with
the true idea of objective justice, antecedent to human positive law,
towards which Civil Society must tend as an end. Lack of conformity
to such a standard does not destroy the Commonwealth, as Cicero held,
but the more it conforms to the true standard of justice, the more
instinct with the virtue of justice does Civil Society become. Thus by
his concept of the eternal law as transcendent and of justice as objec-
tive, exemplary, and non-arbitrary did St. Augustine break from the
Stoic naturalism with its tendency to reduce all law to a purely monistic
17. BouP, L'IDr Dr Vf5-Ti DANS TA PHILSOPHIE DE SAi,"r AUGusznW 262 (1941).
18. Cox-_ssios 3, 8. See also LAARDP, Rfc .rcns suit L'lspnrn POMQUL DZ LA
Rftonari 17 (1926): "Le Droit tel que le d~finiscaent les P±res de l'Vglise n'tait pas
l'expression de la volont6 arbitraire du peuple ou du prince, il itait l'adaptation 4 I
commnunaut6 des prindpes iternels de la nature et de la justice?'
19. CONTRA FAusmua XXI=, 27.
20. LAGAR DE, op. ct. su r note 18, at 29: "Le Droit venait de Dieu, tous en convenait,
mais existait-il dans la raison du Legislatur, ou dans sa volont? Le probme n'est pas
une pure subtiliti. Accepte-t-on le premier systme? On reconnait au droit une ncessit6
absolue, car les concepts de la raison divine sont immuable et iternels. Si P'on tient pour
le second, le droit devient une qualification arbitraire que Dieu accorde ou retire & nos
actes selon son bon plaisir." Cf. Ror AND-Gossrwr, Ll.s FoiDm.mrrs DE LA Mon= Dz
SANT AuGUSTIN 198-200 (1931). St. Augustine's explanation of the eternal law repudiates
rationalism and naturalism without falling into the opposite errors of Kantian no.ninalism.
1952]
102 FORDEAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
principle immanent in all things alike. The result was a revolutionary
challenge to the traditional jurisprudence of the Romans. For though
Stoicism offered a specious basis for the inviolability of the Roman
Imperium, it was wholly inadequate to give intrinsic content to "law"
and "rights." The Roman jurists invested the notion of law and right
with a formality entirely legal. The consent of the people or the will
of the prince, to whom the common sovereignty had been delegated,
sufficed to constitute the full content of the law and its right to compel
compliance. This formalism is aptly expressed by Ulpian's "Justitia est
constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi."
At the base of the juridical equilibrium there exists a principle more
ulterior than the consent of a popular assembly or the will of a prince.
The source of all law and right is the eternal law conformity to which
invests a human act with the virtue of justice.21
2. St. Augustine's Concept of Temporal Law
The second problem, an ethico-juridical problem of antiquity, which
St. Augustine endeavored to answer, followed logically upon the first
just considered. Is a law once invested with the virtue of justice for-
ever inviolable and impervious to change? The perennial Parmedian-
Heraclitean philosophical antithesis of permanence and change, of being
and flux was transposed from the order of speculative philosophy to the
public domain in the correlation of phusis and nomos. Could there pos-
sibly be an objective justice which was temporal, transient, and muta-
ble? St. Augustine showed that the eternal law was widely comprehen-
sive of all human exigencies and historical contingencies to provide the
utimate basis of the legitimacy as well as the norm of morality for the
variable applications of eternal prescriptions to variant human needs
and evolving circumstances. The permanency of justice is in the con-
formity of human law to the eternal law and the proximate title for change
rests directly on the necessities of rational choice and consent. Philosophi-
cally, St. Augustine's answer conferred a significance and value to time and
change which the Parmedian-Heraclitean polar tension had obfuscated.
Historically, St. Augustine's solution was the answer to the legitimate
aspiration for creative politics and provided the doctrinal basis for the
development in theory and actuality of medieval constitutionalism.
21. Id. at 199: "C'est bien parce que Dieu d6fend une action qu'elle est mauvaise. Mals
s'il la defend, c'est qu'ille contredit ]a VWrith, matire . ]a forme de ]a morallt6 et non
pas de la qui est Dieu. 1 faut aller rationnellement de la mat ire a la ortne de la
moraliM et non pas de la forme a la natiare. S'il est permis, pour raisonner, de poser en
Dieu des distinctions, on dira que Saint Augustin fonde la morale dans I'Essence cr6atrtce,
origins et fin des essences cr&es. Le cr6ationisme et l'exemplarisme sont, dans son isprlt,
seuls i meme de justifier le caractire rationnel et le caract~re moral de ]a loi naturelle."
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A constant endeavor of the pagan politeia was to contrive a procedure
for legal changes without risking the dreaded stasis. In principle all laws
were endowed with the sacred quality of immutability, since they were
of divine origin, and were, in fact, never abrogated. 'Men could indeed
make new ones, but the old ones still remained, however they may con-
flict with the new ones. This character of the religious inviolability of
laws proved to be the great cause of the confusion which is observable
among ancient laws. Contradictory laws and those of different epochs
were found together and all claimed compliant obedience. The reso-
lution was but an ad hoc responsum of the ruler or of his judges. When
the religious basis of law gave way before the Stoic's philosophic cosmic
principle, the difficulty remained to plague Roman jurisprudence.'
Legal formalism and the authoritarian responsum combined to give the
power of the state an unlimited legal "discretion."
Three significant passages in the writings of St. Augustine treat di-
rectly with this ethico-legal problem and, historically, were frequently
cited to provide the premises for the evolution of constitutionalism
of medieval provenance.
"Let us call that temporal which, although it is just, may be justly changed in
accordance with the changes of time. Then would it seem to any intelligent being
that law which is called supreme reason, which must ever be obeyed and in ac-
cordance with which the evil merit wretchedness and the good happiness: in accord-
ance with which finally that law which I have said should be called temporal, is
rightly enacted and rightly changed, is immutable and eternal? . . . Therefore,
that I may briefly explain insofar as I am able to do so in words the idea of
the eternal law which is impressed on us, it is that whereby it is just that all things
be rightly ordered. Since then this is the one law i& accordance wit/A which all those
temporal affairs pertaining to the government of men are changed, can this law itself
be changed in any manner?2 4 The author of temporal laws, if he be a good and
wise man, will consult that eternal law of which it is not given to any soul to
judge, that in accordance with its immutable rule he may discern what in the order
of time should be commanded or forbidden. . . . Just as in the case of temporal
laws, although men may judge of them when they enact them, once they arc enacted
and confirmed, it is no longer the judge's part to judge of them, but only according
to them." 2-,
"Man, therefore, finds for the changeable fortunes of human life an unchangeable
rule of action in this eternal law, and his law, though varied according to drcum-
stances, will always conform to it."
22. FusTEr. D COULANGEs, Tm ANCIENT Cr= 254 (1889).
23. CIcERo, R . 3, 31: justice "will require such laws as can never be abrogated."
24. DE LiBnEo A ITsmo 1, 6.
25. Coimis, La Doc=xF Po=mQuE DE S Ar AuaUsrN 142 (1927): "Quele erreur
donc et queue naivete de vouloir fixer pour toujours la justice dans une formule. La justice
est trop grande pour y contenir, et le peu qu'on r.ussit 5, y enfermer s'y trouve bient~t
i l' troit et tend sinon i s' vader, du moins ihilargir sa prison. Car la propre de la justice,
dans la conscience comme dans la citk, est de vouloir sans cesse grandir"
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"Those actions which are offenses against the customs of men, are to be
avoided according to the customs severally prevailing: so that a thing agreed upon
and confirmed, by custom or law of any city or nation, may not be violated at the
lawless pleasure of any, whether native or foreigner. For any part, which harmoniseth
not with the whole, is offensive. But when God commands a thing to be done,
against the customs or compact of any people, though it was never done by them
heretofore, it is to be done; and if intermitted, it is to be restored; and if ordained,
is now to be ordained." 26
Several fundamental principles of law and goverance are inherent in
these three passages: First, there can be no contingency or necessity
in the needs of the State that can exempt itself from the universal sweep
of the eternal law. All changes in the administration of justice, includ-
ing changes in government, find no impediment but rather their source
of justification in the law of God. Secondly, once a disposition has taken
place in "temporal affairs pertaining to the government of men," rightly
enacted or rightly changed, agreed upon and confirmed, there is brought
into existence an objective social truth, arising out of the commitment
in justice, according to which justice is to be administered. The eternal
law is not only the supremacy of the divine law and the moral limitation
of society as well as its source of justice; but it also establishes the obli-
gation of recognizing the supremacy of human positive law by reason
both of the justice inherent in it and the consent from which it arises.
But this is too often forgotten, either because there is a tendency to
confound power with justice and thus place force and law on the same
footing; or because justice is considered inferior to power, whence in-
stead of submitting to law it seeks to dictate to it (in which case force
is rendered paramount over law); or again because justice is looked
upon not only as inferior but as contrary to power, whence it follows
that in order to govern more effectively justice is suppressed and force
is substituted for law. St. Augustine attributes to positive law, par-
ticularly custom law, a content and significance which had escaped the
ancients. Custom law as a product of popular usage is an expression of
the people's will (in the sense that it is not imposed upon them with
complete disregard of their natural sense of discretion). Consequently,
these positive expressions of sound human needs rooted so strongly in
the acknowledgment and agreement of the people can function as a
rudimentary form of constitutional law and can be considered as limit-
ing and defining the terms of agreement between the ruler and his sub-
jects. But St. Augustine is quick to point out that this popular law is
not merely the expression of the popular will. "Where there is no true
justice there can be no right" applies just as rigidly to the people as
26. CoNs soNs 3, 8.
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to the ruler. "For the unjust inventions of men are neither to be con-
sidered nor spoken of as rights. .. by those who misconceive the matter,
that right is that which is useful to the stronger party.' 2 7 Justice is
created neither by popular opinion, nor by usage, but it endures by
itself immutable and constant through all the justifiable and necessary
changes in temporal law.s "There can be no justice or legitimacy in
temporal law that is not derived from the eternal law."' o It is not born
of opinion. It does not issue from the decision of a prince nor is it con-
stituted by the vote of an assembly. The prince is subject to error. The
majorities are capricious and fickle; they are moved by their emotions
and interests. If their votes created the "right" then the day will come
when they will legislate that it is just to steal, etc.30 It follows, then,
that temporal law must embody eternal justice as an objective truth to
be discerned and established by human agreement as the order amongst
men in accordance with the "order" of God.3' Law as the product of
prudential reason must issue forth into order: hence law is defined as
ordinatio rationis.
The early Church had forced the Empire to recognize a higher law
that did not come from the State. St. Augustine 2 urged that the rulers
govern and adjudicate within the limits set by law. In his day till the
later middle ages, the function of adjudication was delegated by the
ruler but never alienated by him. It was not till the fifteenth century
that the judiciary developed as an independent branch of government
from the executive. Consequently, St. Augustine's "jude.x" at least
indirectly refers to the conformity of the ruler to the laws of the land.
The "pactum" suggests rather distantly what will develop in time into
a social contract theory of society. Whether or not St. Augustine in-
tended the ruler to be obliged by law to submission to that law ought
to be decided in the light of the meaning the Fathers gave to their ap-
27. CI=Y OF GOD xix, 21.
28. Coais, op. cit. supra note 25, at 137.
29. DE LiBERo ARBrmo 1, VI, 15.
30. Coimis, op. cit. supra note 25, at 136.
31. Id. at 140: "Sa lgislation doit donc s'elaborer selon une courbe ideals qu part de
la conscience, passe degri par degri du moral au material, de rlindividu 5. ]a collectivt et
aboutit a la contexture extirieure de la societ . Ila soudera ainsi awu lois int&ieures de
l'Ame et prolingera I'ordere naturel que met en nous la justice dans l'organiation tout
entiire de la cite."
32. This is not exclusively St. Augustine's notion. St. Ambrose in his X=I letter to
Valentinian II expresses the same supremacy of positive law over the ruler as well as the
subjects. "And how, 0 Emperor, are we to settle a matter on which you have already
declared your judgment, and have even promulgated laws, so that it is not left to any one
to judge otherwise? But when you laid down this law for others, you laid it down for
yourself as well. For the Emperor is the first to keep the laws which he has paed."
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propriation of the Roman legibus solutus.33 Certainly the ruler is bound
by moral obligation from what we have said of the relation of eternal
law to temporal law. But for want of those institutions which define
the powers of the state (which the modern state has inherited from the
progressive experiments of medieval times) the Roman State must needs
accept in a Christian sense the legibus solutus in order to preserve within
the state a principle of change which every sovereignty must imply.
3. St. Augustine's Principle of Equality and Consent
The specific equality of men was first definitively known when Our
Divine Lord taught the inviolable and transcendent right of man to
attain eternal beatitude, and revealed the universal salvific will of God.
This principle of equality, expressed as an equality in the adopted son-
ship of God, together with Pauline dogma that "all power descends
from God" constituted the greatest liberalizing force in the political
world.
"The effects of the Church upon the Empire may be summed up in one word,
'freedom.' In a word, authority was seen to be a form of service according to God's
will and such service was freedom. It was, however, not from Seneca but from
Christ and St. Paul that the Fathers took their constant theme of the essential
equality of men before which slavery could not stand.... Not only did the Fathers
establish the primitive unity and dignity of man, but seeing slavery as a result of
the Fall, they found that in the sacrifice of Christ a road to freedom that was closed
to Stoicism."3 4
It was to St. Augustine's credit that he was the first Father to corre-
late these two truths and make them the basic principles of the political
order. He brought out, as the pagans had never done before him, the
true significance of consent as bearing on law and authority.
Consent as a practical source of power was recognized as far back as
Solon. But the idea of a defined relationship between government and
governed necessarily presupposes the Christian specific equality of men,
namely, that the individual is inviolable both in reference to the conduct
of others towards him and by reason of his transcendent destiny. This
more definite and enlarged view of man's essential nature is the basis
of inherent and inalienable rights, which, because they are God-given,
must guide and limit the use of that consent. Not consent alone but
consent involving reservations demanded by the objective due order
rising from the nature of reality, constitutes the true basis of govern-
ment.
What distinguishes St. Augustine's principle of equality as the basis
33. Cf. 1 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 163-4.
34. CAM-BRIDOE MEDIEVAL HISTORY c. xx, 592-3.
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for consent in government from the pagan politeia is the underlying
clearer Christian concept of the natural law. In the light of the Chris-
tian revelation of divine and human personality, the natural law is now
considered as involving the due order founded in the nature of things
and their essential relations, to which the free-will of man ought to coa-
form. Limitations upon the power of government must rest not solely
on consent but on those reservations dictated specifically for human
conduct by the natural law. This obviated the pantheistic interpretations
given by the Stoics and the Roman jurists. Writing of the use among
the ancients of the terms natural law and law of nations, ins gentinm,
Viscount Bryce35 observes that "the (Roman) jurists use the two terms
as practically synonymous, though generally employing ies naturae or
naturalis ratio, when they wish to lay stress on the motive or ground of
a rule; ius gentium when they are thinking of it in its practical appli-
cation." This confusion is due to the Stoic's pantheistic concept of the
natural law as common to man and beasts, and the similarity in the laws
of nations was but a manifestation of the all-pervading Cosmic Reason.
But being peculiar to the nations as distinguished from animals such
laws as were found to be alike, were held to constitute the is genthim 0
St. Augustine broke through this all-inclusive pan-naturalism by dis-
tinguishing between the due order (City of God XLX, 13, 14) and an
order established by human agreement (City of God XLX, 24) as a
consequence of the "order of nature" (City of God XIX, 15) created
by God, wherein equal men rationally achieve a temporal order subject
to and defined by the eternal law." From this new standpoint important
inferences follow. Henceforth the ins gentium will be correctly under-
stood3" as a positive human law, expressive of a traditional equity, that
is, approved and consented to by the free agreement of men who have
found it both good, useful, and therefore truly just. National customs,
as a product of popular usage, and consequently the expression of a
people's reason, will gradually assert its supremacy, and as rudimentary
form of constitutional law, limit and define the terms of agreement
35. BR 'CE STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 585 (1901).
36. Gaius' definition runs, "Quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit,
id quod omnes populos peraeque custoditur, vocaturque jus gentium, quasi quo jure onmes
homines utuntur," Lxsn-rr. II, 1.
37. GImSOx, INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE DE SAU AUous-nM 159 (1929): "Ainsi toutes les
prescriptions particulires de notre conscience morale, toutes les legislations changeantes
qui rigissent les peuples, d6coulent d'une seule et mme rigle, adapthe sans ces52 A des
besoins eux-mimes changeants et divers, mais qui, en elle-mime, ne change jamais. Tout ce
qu'il y a de lgitime dans l'individu et dans la cit6 en dirive; elle est viritablement [a loi
les rois. "
38. IsmoRE or SEV.E, E~roLory V, c. 4.
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between the ruler and his subjects. This will appear for the first time
in practical forms in the early coronation oaths of the Merovingians
and, later, in the capitula of Charlemagne.
Thus the temporal law, ensuing from equal men with a right to con-
sent according to the dictates of the natural law, establishes a positive
right based on the natural right to immunity from the arbitrary. It will
be centuries before institutions will develop to guarantee effectively the
enjoyment of this right; but from the day the Churchmen and Christian
rulers attend to those passages of Augustine-De Libero Arbitrio 1, 6;
De Vera Religione c. 31; Confessions 3, 8; City of God XIX, 15-
European society labored to embody in the law of the land the adminis-
tration of justice. Just as there is no natural right or title in any one
to lord it over his equals, so too there is no natural right even in a duly
constituted ruler to disregard arbitrarily the law "agreed upon and con-
firmed" by his equals. In the light of our highly developed institutions
this seems fairly elementary to us at this later date in the history of
Western Civilization. But if we project ourselves into the age of St.
Augustine, we can see what a tremendous energizing and revitalizing
force he is injecting into society. He harmonizes in "well-ordered"
relation and proportion the equality of men and the subjection implied
in government. This he does in relation of freedom embodied in and
protected by law. For liberty is not that which is conceded by govern-
ments to an individual but rather the security of natural rights by posi-
tive law against the arbitrary action of any individual or power. .In
effect, consent to law should restrain authority from compelling an indi-
vidual to do what is not required by his nature.
The pagans had always invested authority with a moral idea, namely,
that it was essentially a divine power (a quid divinum).39 But owing to
their erroneous doctrine on the subject of equality, which is the essen-
tial correlative to any definition of the powers of government, their au-
thority, either from religious motives or from philosophical misconcep-
tions, left the individual completely helpless. 0 St. Augustine strikes at
the roots of absolutism however concealed under the guise of divine rep-
resentation. He distinguishes clearly between the power, which is from
God, and the office itself which is of human origin.4 By his repeated
39. COuwGEs, CITE ANTIQUE 206.
40. Coimts, op. cit. supra note 25, at 121.
41. St. Ambrose and St. John Chrysostom, both contemporaries of St. Augustine, draw
this distinction too but they do not, as St. Augustine does, bring in the significance of con-
sent as related to the equality of men, as the wider basis for the further development of
constitutional government. AMBROsE, ExposiTo IN LUCAx, lib. 4, 29; CnRYSOSTOM, HoM-
niEs ox RoiwAs, Hom. 23: "I am not now speaking about individual rulers, but about
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insistence upon the principle that no man has the right by reason of
his nature to rule another,' and that the State is an association en-
suing for a purpose common to all its members, St. Augustine prepares
the way for a theory of consent as the basis of the right to rule.
"In this sense then in a Christian political order authority may be said to be of
divine right. The classical misconception on the point consists in supposing that all
power is legitimate because all power comes from God. The true doctrine is that
no power is legitimate save that which comes from God. To have the right to exact
obedience, the authority must first itself obey the eternal law; its whole legitimacy
consists in being an expression of that law." 43
By relating the divine origin of authority to the principle of equality,
St. Augustine has provided us with a basis for constitutional limitation,
not merely as a limitation of wrongdoing but as a limitation of the power
the thing in itself . . . (Paul) does not say 'there is no ruler but from God'; but it is
the thing he speaks of, and says: 'There is no power but from God."'
42. Crry oF GOD X, 15: According to St. Augustine, the State is willed by God as
a remedial institution consequent to the Fall of man. Authority is therefore for him,
in the words of St. Paul (Romans, xiii): "God's minister for good" and "an avenger to
execute wrath upon him that doth evil." Paul's exhortation to the Romans, who felt that
their Christian faith exempted them from obedience to the temporal rulers, is not a dog-
matic definition of the nature of political society but a statement of the beneficent conse-
quences of a power given by God Himself. St. Augustine cited Romans xii in his
polemic with the Donatists to justify his recourse to State intervention for protection
against the violence of the Circumcelliones and the extreme rabid elements of the Donatists.
It is not till the thirteenth century, that St. Thomas is to show that the State is an essen-
tial requirement for the natural final end of man, and on this account, then, authority, so
necessary for the purpose of the State, is equally natural.
43. Gmsoz-, Tna SPnrr oF MxoixvA.v Prosoirnv 475 n. 21 (1931), De Libero Arbitrio
I. 6. Bishops of the Middle Ages and a number of political writers and counsellors of
kings made repeated and countless references to the words of St. Augustine and under-
scored in forcible terms the root of political evil as the libido dominandi, the sin of the
devil, the sin of pride. Portraits of Christian Princes and Mirrors of Justice were modelled
on the passages from the City of God. In the absence of institutional checls, there was
no more effectual moral restraint on the Christian conscience of the Middle Ages than the
charge of pride, particularly at a time when noble birth and force of arms accounted in
part for the power of many rulers. Pride, not greed, is the great deadly sin that does
violence to the "just peace of God, and loves its own unjust peace." Today, the superbis
has been replaced by humilitas as the most deadly of the seven deadly sins by our modern
anti-Christians. St. Augustine scores in word repeatedly quoted in mediev'al times the
arbitrary assumption of power over fellow-equal as the libido dominandi. It is a Isinful
soul that aspires to lord it even over those who are by nature its equal, that is, its fellow-
men. This is a reach of arrogance utterly intolerable." DE D0ocrnnA Cmu.sm A , 23,
also: "It is thus that pride in its perversity apes God. It abhors equality with other men
under Him; but, instead of His rule, it seeks to impose a rule of its own upon its eqtials.
It abhors, that is to say, the just peace of God, and loves its own unjust peace; but it
cannot help loving peace of one kind or another. For there is no vice so clean contrary
to nature that it obliterates even the faintest traces of nature." Crrv or Gon c. 'XM, 12.
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itself. The pagan philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, had for-
mulated a hierarchy of duties in accordance with "justice." But none
of them could enter into the intrinsic value of justice except to refer it
to a cosmic functional disposition of human action that eliminated dis-
integrating conflict and resulted in a pacific and aesthetic order of
co-existence.44 St. Augustine makes morality inherent in the social order
and invests it with the virtue of justice in a way never understood by
the pagans. His Christian principle of equality arising out of a free
personality, and, as related by him to the true origin, nature, and func-
tion of authority, becomes the basis for a Christian version of creative
politics in answer to the pagan secular autarchia. A social consciousness
is awakened by the necessary demands of the natural order and out of
a multitude of. "people" is constituted by a pactum societatis with a view
to concord and peace founded on justice. Not then the peace of con-
quest, which even an organized band of thieves have amongst them;
but a peace resulting from the harmonious activity of men according to
an order that is above purely human contrivance yet within the co-
operative efforts of a people to discern and realize."
44. COCHRANE, CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE 501 (1940): "The error of
Classicism may be summarily described as a failure to identify the true source of power
and, therewith, its true character and conditions. The error thus indicated is original, and
to it may be ascribed the whole tissue of fallacies which frustrate the secular aspirations
of men. These fallacies Christianity explodes in a sentence: all power comcth from on high.
In so doing, it does not subscribe to the antithesis which sets 'power' in opposition to
benevolence after the manner of those flabby sentimentalists whom Aristotle so sharply
criticizes in a famous chapter of the Politics. Nor is it condemned to labour with Aristotle
himself in a vain endeavor to effect a partial reconciliation between the two. For It per-
ceives that, however vicious in principle, the secular desire of man to apprehend and possess
himself of power is but the perversion of a wholly natural and proper impulse to save
himself from danger and destruction; and that it may be explained as a consequence of
his inability to recognize his own highest and greatest good. Accordingly, for the Chris-
tians, the antithesis is not between 'benevolence' and 'power'; it is rather between the
love of power and the power of love. From this standpoint the pax caelestis, the order of
the divine society, constitutes at the same time the order of love. This may well be mys-
terious, but it is not mythical or hypothetical. For it means simply that the self-same
human wills have attached themselves, not to the transcendental objects (that they leave to
Platonism) but to a principle which gives to the 'object' world a wholly fresh complexion
thus 'making all things new.' That is to say, what it prescribes is adhaerere Deo, adhesion
to God, the source of truth, beauty and goodness, the supreme reality, as the one funda-
mental principle for individual regeneration and for social reformation, the point of de-
parture for a fresh experiment in human relationships, on the acceptance of which test3
the only real hope of fulfilling the promise of a secular life." (Italics mine).
45. Coasala, op. cit. supra note 25, at 78: "Concord, that is to say, the union of
hearts, constitutes the first foundation of the city. The second, according to St. Augustine,
is the -union of wills (compositio voluntatum). These two he takes up into the third, a
communion of nature. This communion of nature, or narrow concentration of interests of
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4. St. Augustine's Doctrine of Sound Human Nature
It would be a serious error, in appraising pagan politeia, simply to
depreciate ancient institutions and classical ideas. Antiquity possesses
legitimate claim upon our respect because Greece and Rome bore a
masterful part in the struggle between good and evil, truth and error,
liberty and oppression. We have inherited their wisdom and have drawn
lessons from their failures. To dissever the present from its connexion
with and indebtedness to the past is to cut the present from its roots.
For, barring the intellectual achievements of the Fathers and the
Schoolmen, modern non-Christian thought has been a retrogression in
comparison with the inventive progress of pagan thought. The lessons
born of the contrasts of pagan and Christian polity is the full apprecia-
tion of the implications of the flaws, limitations, and inadequacies of
the classical commonwealth, (of antiquity or in any revived form there-
after), when assumed as absolutes and to realize the tremendously
significant import of the Christian contribution to the science of gov-
ernance.
St. Augustine traced the flaws in the Roman Imperium to the accep-
tance of a defective starting point. What was needed to rehabilitate
the Roman State was the radical revision of first principles, and this he
proposed to his countrymen as the real fulfillment of the Roman aspira-
tion to secular achievement. The Graeco-Roman speculation had pried
into the nature of man and left it more captive than ever. St. Augustine
had known this only too intensely from his own personal life. In his
treatises Contra Academicos, De Moribus Afanichaeoumn, De Libero Ar-
bitrio, and De Trinitate, to mention only the pertinent ones, we have
St. Augustine's liberation from the world of doubt, from irresponsible
animality, and the assertion of conscious self-determination, which by
reason of man's direct ordination to God, is endowed with stewardship
over the irrational universe. This sense of freedom, arising from the
certain knowledge of man's destiny, is based on his concept of sound
human nature.
By sound human nature, we understand, in brief, that the intrinsic
finality of man is operative and can attain its distinctive finis. It does
not matter whether we consider man before or after the Fall, or in any
all kinds, moral and material, within the same groups, nature-which is one and the same
in all men-has placed under the charge of all members. This union of hearts and wills
and interests, this piactum societatis, as St. Augustine calls it in his Confessions, constitutes a
bond 'redacta in vinculum ...devincta,' which binds all the members of the society one
to the other. This bond comprises all reciprocal commitments, all acknowledged rights, all




possible natural state, viz., destined to natural beatitude. We can know
the soundness of human nature either by its relation to realities distinct
from itself-God, and the universe-or by a study of its own faculties.
In place of Destiny, Fate, Ananke, Prime-Mover, the "formal" god
of Ideas, or the physical god, nature or universe, the Judaic-Christian
revelation made known the true nature of a provident and loving God.
A new and sound cosmology could now be evolved based on a free
creative act. Only a "personal" God could differentiate between differ-
ent orders of existence and perfections, and be the same Author of
human personality and its inviolable freedom and of irrational creatures
governed by necessary law. It was now possible to envisage the divine
reality as both transcendent and immanent, prior to nature, the world
of time and space, in which we live, and yet operative within it. The
word "creation" defined as "productio ex nihilo, ab omni necessitate
libera" expresses the sense of direct and immediate divine activity and
its freedom from all compulsion, while in the knowledge of the divine
and human personality we have the key to the understanding of man
as the "image" of his Creator" and the full moral import of that re-
lationship. Man and his destiny was no longer subject to any part of
physical creation; he was liberated from the nightmare involved in the
concept of nature as a closed system, determined by its own exclusive
laws, and of the antithesis between liberty and cosmological necessi-
tarianism.4 ' The Promethean drama was cancelled and virtue no longer
strove desperately against chance and necessity. For, by the Christian
negation of the classical antithesis between man and environment, men
could breathe with the freedom of the sonship of God to realize the
Kingdom of God both within themselves and without. God, the Summum
Bonum, is the bonum necessarium of man and in terms of this transcen-
dental relation we have the ratio of any human achievement and the
measure of true progress. The Good thus proposed is strictly a "per-
46. BUTCHEYR, Somm AspECTS or GnEx GmuUs 79 (1916): "Not until man was rescued
out of the kingdom of nature and taken up into the commonwealth of God and into
personal relations with the Divine being, could he be more than a member of a social
organism, or an instrument for achieving the ends of the State. Then only did a universal
morality become possible and the idea of personality receive its full content."
47. Stoicism began with an attempt to get behind the merely formal definition of super-
stition and to discriminate between popular and vulgar belief on the one hand, and true
religion on the other, on the basis of a cosmology erected upon "fate," ordo, series causarutr
of "nature." It then proceeded to assert, as the supreme command of ethics, the 'precept:
Follow nature. The significance of such a command must, however, remain questionable
in this particular context; since, if nature is in fact fate or destiny, it is not clear how far
anyone is at liberty to defy her ordinances, is perhaps indicated by the famous verse from
the hymn of Cleanthes: ducunt volentem fata nolentem trahunt.
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sonal" good, not a "corporative" or "collective" good. The relation of
the individual conscience to a living personal God transcends all social,
national, and racial divisions and introduces a new element into the prob-
lems of political philosophy. It radically diminishes the old prerogatives
of the civil State; it is the moral limitation of all authority, law and gov-
ernment and offers the ultimate basis for constitutional (that is to say,
self-imposed) limitation.
This Summum Bonurn is not imaginary nor problematic. It is real and
attainable. Wisdom~s is the knowledge and possession of this Sovereign
Good. Therefore it is within the power of man to know and choose God.
Herein is the essential difference between the Stoic "reason" as the
"common patrimony of humanity," and the Augustinian active intelli-
gence of each individual to discern for itself, with Divine assistance, the
48. This, summarily, is the direct answer of St. Augustine to the Academics who failed
to see the contradiction implied in their academic doubt. They strove for ",isdomi,1" a
way of life that gives its fulfillment of "satiety" while they asserted at the same time
the uncertainty of its attainment. St. Augustine rejected scepticism with complete assurance.
"Academic doubt," he says, "is academic madness." Both intellectually and morally its
consequences are dire; it leads to a cult of the unintelligible and finally to the suicidal
end of the Stoics. But St. Augustine's conviction proceeds from an inescapable fact.
We do know the truth and we cannot not know it. There are subjective evidences which
would not exist if they did not consist in the apprehension of objective truth, in the
attainment of which sense knowledge is a reliable vehicle. And, if for the ake of argu-
ment, we were to grant and not concede the objections the Academics urged against the
validity of the evidence of our sense, St. Augustine points out there are kinds of knowledge
to which these objections do not apply. The distinction between right and wrong, the
force of a logical argument, the apprehension of unity in numbers, the apprehension of
being, beauty, goodness and truth-these are proofs of intellectual activity, where the
illusions of sense cannot affect us, and about which we are in comple!e agreement with
one another. There is an intelligible order which is not revealed to us by mere sense-
perception and which is not subject to the variableness of things of sense. But whence
can we attain to a knowledge of these unchanging realities? Just as the sun not only
makes all other things to appear but is itself apparent to the eye, so is it that God Who
is the Truth, not only makes all truths known to man, but is Himself knowable by our
intelligence. For the attributes of truth are the attributes of God. We prescind here
from the debate between Gilson and Boyer on the intimate nature of knowledge according
to St. Augustine. What is pertinent here is the assurance of the certitude of knowledge
implied in the doctrine of illumination. We cannot know that which is not. That which
is real is intelligible for in the "being" which it has received from God, it posses s es the
intelligibility of its own existence, had by participation from Creative Truth. Here we
have the ultimate reason for the goodness and order in the universe, according to which,
each degree of existence seeks its own finality in realizing that perfection which God
has willed to it. Order is not superadded to being; it is identical with being. The dialectic
process does not create this vision however helpful it be in the cognizance of this ob-
jective order. There are intellections which are common to all intelligences and force the
way to objective knowledge, to the knowledge of truth outside the individual mind,
which determines the predications of judgments.
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essential relation of things; and though it may err, it asserts the inde-
pendent competence of each to regulate human activity. Felicity, wis-
dom, "insight" into truth are not confined to the Aristotelian civilized
man, nor are they the peculiar privilege of certain Platonic "types."
These blessings depend upon the power of rational choice, and as this,
in turn, is a function of conscious life, it is inherent in the native en-
dowment of mankind. As such, it is inalienable, in the sense, at least,
that it can be impaired by no power from outside. Thus St. Augustine
is able to posit the individual within the social order49 without destroy-
ing his independence.5° St. Augustine, in denying the pretensions of
reason to omniscience and infallibility on the one hand and on the other
its individual uncertainty, saved reason by affirming the existence of an
order of truth and value, which, being in the world as well as beyond
it, was within the power of man to apprehend.,' And, in saving the
reason, at the same time he saved the will, by imparting to it that ele-
ment of rationality without which it must degenerate into mere subjec-
tive wilfulness. St. Augustine liberates human nature from any deter-
minations outside itself. He vindicates for man the power to find
"peace" for his body, and its appetite, "peace" of the rational soul in
the harmony of knowledge and action, "peace" between man and man
in well-ordered concord, civil peace in the righteous relations between
the citizens; and all relations and ordinations rising according to the
objective order of things to a harmonious enjoyment of God. The tran-
quillity issuing from this just order is the peace of God.
The freedom of the rational soul is part and parcel of its rationality.
In this conception of the will, as an autonomous determination of the
total self and as the power to bring about in the social world the order
prescribed by the nature of things--its naturalis ordo prescribit-St.
Augustine discovered the true principle of "creative politics" whose
49. 1 SERTILLANGES, LE C msri-niqis= ET LEs PHnoSOPMES 209: "L'oeuvro du bten
et l'obtention de ]a b~atitude n'est pas seulement un fait individual; c'est un fait
social, en ce que, i~s par nature et vou6s a l'amour, nous ne pouvons vivre, progresser
et aboutir qu'ensemble. Ici, thologien toujours, Augustin so garde bien de fonder Ia
soci~t6 humaine .uniquement en raison. Ne f6t-elle qu'un fait de raison, ello s'enracinerait
toujours en Dieu, et l'autoriti qui en est le lien serait toujours finalement une autorlt6 do
Dieu. Mais elle se fonde sur la charitY, c'est-i-dire sur Dieu pris comme objet commune
de ]a beatitude derni~re. On s'aime parce qu'on aime Dieu et qu'on est anim6 envers
lui d'une commune espIrance. L'ordre social n'est justifi finalement qu'ainsi, parco quo
tel est l'ordre vrai et telle notre finalit6 veritable."
50. BoYR, op. cit. supra note 17, at 95: "Un peuple est autre chose que quelques
millions d'individus. C'est que ceux-ci ne sont pas produite au hasard ni sans concourir
a un but determine. Ils sont parties d'un tout."




vitality and vigor sprang from every member of society. This he vindi-
cated vigorously against every pagan school of thought which destroyed
the independence of the individual by a bewildering scepticism or as-
sumption into a World-Soul. The significance of the freedom of the will
is not wholly in its efficacy, its power as efficient cause but in its affec-
tionate pursuit of the true good, which is outside itself, God. The topic
of temporal felicity, if it be related to wisdom, as the pagan sages ad-
mitted, rests on the philosophic and theological conception of God as
the Summum Bonum. The moral gulf between the pagans and the
Christians could be traced to the pagan eudaemonism and the Christian
Paternity of God. The Aristotelian appetitus ad forman assumes in St.
Augustine a mystical meaning. It goes beyond the cosmological order
to the human order and finds in the necessity of adhering to God by
loving fidelity, its real personal happiness. From this point of view, any
effort at achieving a just social order should treat men as ends rather
than as means. It condemns as false, exploitation and power politics
and gives the individual citizen a stature in the State never conceded nor
even conceived by the pagan state. When Christianity established with
definitive clarity the transcendental relation of man to God, he was
freed from Greek contingency, Epicurean chance, and Stoic fate. The
cult of the unintelligible dissolves in the certain possession of divine
truths, and the apotheosis of the fortuitous exception to the order of
necessity, namely, the charismatic leader, becomes unbearably repug-
nant. In asserting our independence of "external causes," St. Augustine
is far from declaring a state of warfare between ourselves and the things
about us. Rather the existence of evil is to be explained by the deordina-
tion of man's will, which St. Augustine calls the sin of the devil-pride.
Falsitas non ex rebus sed ex peccatis?2
The pagan world justified power politics as a surety against the acci-
dents of human co-existence. St. Augustine strikes at the false picture
of nature underlying the pagan czipiditas dontinandi. All that God gives
us is in its own nature good, as the Creator at first pronounced it to be.
In the full view of all the evil in the world, physical and moral, all
the suffering and all the sin, St. Augustine maintains, in the light of reve-
lation and with the help of Plato, that evil is not an absolute, positive
factor in the world but that it is only the privation of good. There is
no existence apart from the good. By thus insisting on the unreality
of evil, on its unsubstantiality and nothingness, St. Augustine is able
to strike a blow at the pessimistic foundations of any politeia that would
herd or coerce human beings like so many recalcitrant animals. Society,
52. DE VERA REuGIONE XXX VI, 66.
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rather, is to foster those conditions of co-existence that would increase
the freedom of the individual in seeking his true happiness while yet
sojourning on earth. St. Augustine's doctrine on the soundness of
human nature can not be more sublimely suggested than by the resem-
blance he draws between our will, intellect, and memory and the Three
Divine Persons. With the courage of the convert who has seen the Truth
and been liberated by it, St. Augustine does not hesitate to defend the
soundness of human nature, in spite of any harrowing memories of his
past. He exposes the error of the Platonists which rested upon a false
antithesis between body and soul. He rejects Stoic impassivity as a mon-
strous vanity. All things work for the good of those who love God. The
very passions which disturb the even tenor of life may be rightly di-
rected and offer occasions for self-discipline. The ancients had labored
under a defective psychology. They never had any clear idea of the
will as a factor in moral actions, and therefore they ascribed to knowl-
edge functions which it cannot perform.63 St. Augustine offered Chris-
tianity to them not as a superior gnosis but as a way of life which would
regenerate the individual from the decadence of pagan ethics and re-
ligion, and as a living creative force restore the health of the State. As
for his doctrine on grace, it emerges as the answer to a perfectly normal
and legitimate human demand for illumination and power. Reason
strives toward the prizes of power and faith secures the greater adven-
tures of reason.
We cannot help observe that there is providence (for the history of
philosophy) in the heresies that St. Augustine combatted. In opposing
the morbid depravity of Manichaeism, he vindicated the goodness of the
nature of man. In opposing Pelagianism, he rejected the resurgence of
the Stoic's optimistic naturalism, and defined the limitations of human
nature. Since evil is not inherent in the nature of men, no one can ever
assert that it is rooted in the corrupting institutions of society; cer-
tainly not if society, to which men are impelled by a sense of human
53. If for Socrates knowledge is virtue, and one were to insist against the objections
of Aristotle that Socrates referred to a moving, compelling personal conviction, St.
Augustine on the other hand casts light on the inadequacy of the Socratic psychology
by proving the converse -untrue. Socrates held that error and wrongdoing proceeded from
ignorance whereas for the Christian culpability presupposes knowledge and deliberation.
It is the turning away from truth that helps confirm wrongdoing.
Cf. DE LIBERO ARBiTio 1I1, 52: "It is the most just punishment of sin, that everyone
should lose that which he would not use well, when he might have done so without any diffi-
culty if he had wished: that is to say that he who knows what is right and does not do it
should lose the knowledge of what is right; and that he will not do right when he
might should lose the power of doing it. For in actual fact ignorance and incapacity are
penalties that befall every soul that sins."
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solidarity and the need for one another, is the work of good wills guided
by the true objects of love. Corruption is not inherent in the political
fabric, independently of the wills which create and sustain it. St. Au-
gustine is far from denying that society is bound together by a com-
munity of interests and legal rights. The utilitarian aspects of society is
but part and parcel of the character of our temporal existence. Yet con-
flict can not be avoided, nor justice be but an imposition, and the in-
dividual reduced to a numerical expression of activity, if society is or-
ganized apart from God. The soundness of human nature is vindicated
by the unhappiness and the disorders that ensue when society denies to
it the true objects of love. The explanation of evil is rooted in the re-
fusal of man to acknowledge his privileges and responsibilities according
to the condition of his nature, and strives to create his own truth and
his own vision of happiness.
"St. Augustine thus discovers the clue to hunm history,... purely and simply in
the congenital impulse of humanw beings to attain happiness. And this happiness
they find in order, that is to say, a disposition of arrangement of equal and unequal
things in such a way to allocate each to its own place... . Life is thus conceived
as inherently and intrinsically order. In the effort to achieve such an order, success
or failure will depend upon (a) an accurate estimate of the things in which true
felicity may be found, and (b) the subordination of all other values to those which
are found to be ultimate. In other words it depends upon a combination of intel-
lectual insight and moral power. . . . In the first place it presupposes a grasp of
first principles, in default of which thought must inevitably run wild. And, in the
second place, it involves processes which are no less moral than mental, that of
gravest danger confronting the thinker being that of permitting his own shadow to
fall between himself and the truth. 'It is obvious,' observes St. Augustine, 'that
error could ever have arisen in religion, had not the mind chosen to worship either
itself or body or its own vain imaginings. That it should have succumbed to this
temptation is, of course, to be attributed to pride (superbia) which thus for him, as
for Tertullian, is the devil's own sin, and peculiarly, the sin of philosophers. . . ! "U'
"Can Paganism, I ask you, produce anything equal to ours, the one true philoso-
phy?,,5s
54. Cocmuna-, op. cit. supra note 44, at 486-7.
55. CONTRA Iui=AIua IV, 14, 72.
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II. ST. AUGUSTINE AND MEDIEVAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
After the destruction of the Roman World by the great barbarian
invasions of the fifth century, an enormous task of organization fell
upon the Pontiffs, Bishops, and the Christian leaders. From the ruins
and disillusionments of the heretofore imperishable Roma Aeterna there
was to rise a new social order reconstructed on Christian truths and on
St. Augustine's four master ideas of peace, justice, order, and law.
Scholars differ on the paramountcy of each. Bernheim 0 maintains that
the Augustan pax is primary amongst St. Augustine's political concepts;
Arquilliere 7 holds first justice and then order; Otto von Gierke's 8
preference is for St. Augustine's concept of order and the immense influ-
ence it had in medieval, social, and political doctrine, particularly in
the social philosphy of St. Thomas Aquinas. A contemporary scholar 0
inclines to the view that the true guiding idea for St. Augustine is his
concept of law, which, as he observes, while it is not mentioned as often
as others, is certainly conceived as their presupposition. This emphatic
divergence of preference attests to the equally great importance and
significance of these four central ideas in the teaching of St. Augustine.
Certainly these concepts essentially connote one another at least medi-
ately and the inferences drawn from one cannot but affect the logic
of the other no less than the application of one to the problems of so-
ciety would not involve the immediacy of the others.
Of the Christian truths which bore direct import for the new social
order of Christendom, the principal one, from which most of the others
are but necessary derivatives, was the inviolability of the human per-
sonality. This Christian revelation caused a radical revision of the tra-
ditional viewpoint of the individual in society and, as a consequence, a
fresh revaluation of values.6" The tremendous effects of the Christian
revelation of human personality on the ensuing Christian era not only
in social thinking and upon the social order but also in the evolution of
56. ARQUILLIERE, L'AUGUSTINISME POLITIQUE 9 (1934).
57. Id. at 17.
58. POLITICAL THEORIES Or THE MIDDLE AGES 101 n. 3 (1913).
59. PARSONS, THE INFLUENCE OF ROMANS XIII ON CHRISTIAN POLITICAL TUOONT
IN THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 326 (Feb. 1941).
60. STuazo, CHURCH AND STATE 23 (1939): "In the sociological field Christianity brought
about an inversion and re-ordering of values. Society is nothing more than the projection
of the individual; all social foundations are laid by the individual. The submergence
of the individual in the social form, as in pre-Christian societies, was a deviation and
in many cases a perversion; the return of the individual as the basis of very social value
is a conversion and a restoration."
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a doctrine of rights, connatural and juridical, was to prove one of the
most significant contributions of Christendom to the genesis of me-
dieval constitutionalism.
"In this sense Medieval Doctrine was already filled with the thought of the inborn
and indestructible rights of the individual The formulation and classification of such
rights belonged to a later stage in the growth of the theory of the Natural Law.
Still, as a matter of principle, a recognition of their existence may be found already
in the medieval Philosophy of Right when it attributes an absolute and objective
validity to the highest maxims of Natural and Divine Law. Moreover, a fugitive
glance at Medieval Doctrine suffices to perceive how throughout it all, in sharp
contrast tot the theories of Antiquity, runs the thought of the absolute and imperish-
able value of the Individual: a thought revealed by Christianity. . . .That every
individual by virtue of his eternal destiny is at the core somewhat holy and its-
destructible even in relation to the Highest Power; that the smallest part had a
value of its own, and not merely because it is a part of a whole; that every man is to
be regarded by the Community, never as a mere instrument, but also as an end:
all this is not merely suggested, but is more or less clearly expressed."'O
The doctrine of the rights had by human nature and therefore inalien-
able, prior to and superseding the prerogatives of the state authority
was entirely alien to the pagan politeia. From this doctrine would evolve
in the course of history a succession of legal guarantees variously de-
nominated as franchises, liberties, privileges in order the better to se-
cure through cooperative organized effort the inviolability and immunity
of man against arbitrary action. In this historic development, the politi-
cal philosophy of St. Augustine worked as a ferment for a better clari-
fication of the meaning of these rights, and concurrently, toward the
more concrete embodiment of them in institutional forms till finally the
hono legalis became consonant with the homo liber. This development
will express itself on the three levels of ideas, political virtues or prac-
tical habits, and institutions, and within the two categories of thought
and actualities.
1. EccLESIAsTicAL WITNESSES
a. St. Isidore of Seville
In the construction of the new social order, the Pax Christiana, two
doctrines in particular acted forcibly upon the minds of the Christian
leaders, namely, St. Augustine's principle of equality and his concept
of the nature and purpose of temporal law. As we trace the expansion
of St. Augustine's teaching into a tradition, we will select from the ag-
gregate multitude of evidence only such specific references which will illus-
trate successive stages of development both doctrinal and actual.
61. VoN GImKa, PormcAL THEORIES Or THE MIDLr. Aors 81-2 (Maitland's transL
1927).
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The first major advance based upon St. Augustine's teaching occurred
in the seventh century. In the Etymologiae and Sententiae of St. Isidore
of Seville we find the first striking illustration of the slowly modifying
influence of St. Augustine's ideas upon the principles of Roman Law. 2
In a land where several distinct cultures met and blended, the Iberian,
Goth, Roman, and Christian, the writings of Isidore, which were to
serve actually as the textbooks of the Middle Ages, together with his
keen practical evaluation of the contributions of Roman institutions,
were responsible for the origins of a nascent national unity in Spain. He
was learned in the best achievements of pagan thought and freely
acknowledged his indebtedness to the "ancients.""3 Yet at the same time
he was acutely aware of the serious deficiencies of the pagan's polity.
Both his Etymologies and Sentences present a whole thesis of political
theory, and what he says is significant because "he is giving us not
merely his own judgments but the generally current conceptions of his
time." His definitions were eventually embodied, in the twelfth century,
in Gratian's Decretum, and so passed into the structure of the Canon
Law, and furnished the form of all the medieval ecclesiastical treatment
on the subject of law. St. Isidore transmitted the doctrine of St. Augus-
tine by his own use of Orosius. Roman law was characteristically
"formal"; it derived its right to compliance by the very fact that it was
enacted by the consent of a popular assembly or by the will of the
Prince. St. Augustine had shown how the norms of justice antecede and
must govern human choice. St. Isidore clarified the content of the Au-
gustan objective norm by defining (with a sound juridical sense) the
material characteristics of law."6
62. SEJOURNE, SAINT ISIDORE DE SEvILLE, Son role dans l'histoire du drol$ canonique
66 et seq. (1929). Cf. id. n. 2, 64: "La philosophie du droit marque des conqu6tes dans
Saint Isidore. S'il est vrai que 'les Jurisconsultes romains n'ont pas donn6 des "choses",
la definition large et philosophique que nous en donnons, et qul comprend en lles tout
ce qui peut 8tre robjet d'un droit' (Ortolan) ils faut dire que cette d6finition so trouve
au livre V des ttymologies, chapter xxv: 'Res sunt quae in nostro lure consistunt.'"
63. DE LABRiOLLE, HISTORY AND LITERATURE OF Css AMTY 517 (1925). Long
before the Arabs awakened to an appreciation of Greek philosophy, Isidore had introduced
Aristotle to his countrymen.
64. 1 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 107.
65. In his edition of HiSTORIANUm ADvERsvUM PAGANOS lib. vii, 5 of CoRvus
SCRIT0Rumc ECCLESlASTICORUM (1882), Zangmeister shows that its author, Oroslus, used
St. Augustine 53 times, borrowing from the De Civitate Dei, the Confessions, and the
letters. He says it is certain (p. xxx) that Isidore, though be does not mention Oroslus,
used him in his De Natura, the Chronicon, the History of the Goths, Suevi and Vandala,
and in the Etymologies.




"Law should be honesta, just, possible, according to nature, conformed to the
customs of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful, clear, also
so as not to contain anything which by its obscurity might lead to wariness; it
should be devised for the common good of all the citizens, and not for the private
interests only of some individual."67
In St. Isidore's matter for positive law and its ethical quality, we have
the first beginnings of that long tradition which is to evolve into "funda-
mental rights of men," "traditional liberties," long established usages
that are rooted in the consent of the people and their usefulness, and in
all those instruments which retain positive guarantees of natural law
rights. For the natural law is nothing but the law of God imprinted in
our rational natures for the conservation of our nature and for the pro-
motion of its perfective end; a law which man discerns by his reason
and recognizes its moral necessity. But this law is not, and cannot be,
in itself a code. It is no substitute for human law, though it gives au-
thority and direction to human law.
Another contribution of St. Isidore was his teaching that consent must
be consequent upon the reasonableness of law evidenced by the popular
origin of law, in its sound discretion and general adoption. This was a
new and vital point for the Christian development of law and a sharp
departure from the beneplaitum and arbitrium of the Roman ruler.
"Law is something established by the people which the elders together with
the common people have approved. For what the king or emperor decrees is
called constitution or edict. The institution of equity is twofold, sometimes in
laws, sometimes in usage. The difference between law and usage is that law is
written, but usage is custom approved by length of time or tunwitten law, for law
is so called from legendo, for it is written. ' Gs
"Usage is a long standing custom derived front manners only. Custom is a kind of
right instituted by manners which is taken for law when the law is lacking; nor
does it matter whether it exists in writing or in reason, seeing that reason commends
the law also."' '
"Moreover, if the law is founded on reason everything will be law which is foumded
on reason; so long as it accords with religion, it agrees with discipline and is an aid
to salvation. It is called custom because it is in common use.o70
Gratian, who incorporated St. Isidore's divisions and definition of law
into his Decretum, was so impressed with the doctrine of sound utility in
accord with reason and faith which St. Isidore's analysis of popular con-
sent presupposed in custom law, that he concluded that all valid law
67. ETMOLOGIES 10, 6. It is repeated in Ivo oF CmRanxs Pmo-A, the handbook
of canon law.
68. 2 ETMOLOGIES 10, 1.
69. 2 id. at 10, 2.
70. 2 id. at 10, 3.
1952]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
is really custom law, that part which is written down being called con-
stitutio sive jus, while that part which is not written is known as consue-
tudo. He prescribed for the legitimacy of enacted law the same virtues
which constituted the validity of custom law and thus formulated a com-
mon basis of justification for any sort of good law. Whereas St. Augustine's
principle of equality disclosed the necessity for consent in government, St.
Isidore's analysis of the material objects of law brought out more fully the
ethical and legal significance of that consent once given.
A third development of St. Isidore was based on St. Augustine's clear
distinction between the due order and an order established by human
agreement. In Isidore of Seville we have the first explicit instance of a
definite recognition of a real difference between the natural law and the
law of nations. The natural law is no longer seen as an instinct common
to all, animals and men.71 True, St. Isidore says that men follow it
"instinctu naturae," but this is contrasted, not with reason, but with
"constitutio aliqua," and under the definition there is included an ethical
habit such as the "depositae rei vel commendatae pecuniae restitulio."
This "instinctu naturae" ought to be translated as "had by an instinct,"7
or the natural inclination of reason to detect, as Isidore says, what is
"in accord with natural equity." Whence jus gentium is henceforth
classed in the category of positive human law because the actions of St.
Isidore lists in this definition are those which "nearly all nations have
made their custom." Jus gentium is a species of international custom,
and like national customs, are commitments in justice because of the
popular consent involved in the general and prolonged practice. From
the nature of the instances which St. Isidore adduces of the material
(intrinsic) content oflaw as constitutive of its justice, viz., of its reason-
ableness as distinct from its legitimacy which derives from will-we may
logically infer that his definitions, which bear many literal similarities to
Ulpian and the Institutes, are actually radical emendations of the Roman
legal formalism.
One of the dicta of St. Isidore, frequently quoted during the Middle
Ages, was his famous definition of the true king. He converted an old
proverb, "Thou shalt be king if thou do right: if not, thou shalt not
be king," into a norm of the legitimacy of government. He was not
content to say that the king was the representative of God and account-
able to Him on the Last Day for the use of the regal power. Rather, he
turned the original precept of St. Paul upon the prince himself. The
corollary of that teaching is that all power must rule justly; and if the
king does not use his power justly, he loses it. True, St. Isidore said
71. 1 ULPIAN, INST. 2.
72. 1 CARLY'LE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 108. ETYuOLOGES V, 4.
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nothing of how the king is to be deprived of his power. But he did main-
tain that it is a just thing that a prince should obey his own laws. May
we not legitimately suggest that St. Isidore vaguely felt the king's rule73
should be subject somehow to the judgment of the realm? How else
could a king effectively cease to be king? The logic implied in St. Isi-
dore's dictum was to ferment in the minds of the political theorists and
statesmen of medieval Christendom till it gradually evolved through the
centuries in the struggle for constitutional supremacy into effective in-
stitutional ways and means of holding royal power responsible and ac-
countable to the governed. The king74 was to be recognized apart from
the oppressive tyrant on the basis of St. Isidore's historic and distin-
guishing norm of governance for the public weal as against the rule for
the sake of private interest and royal pleasure. Lastly, an entirely new
meaning and construction is given to lex and us, which in Roman law
were antithetical." The ethical and legal character of law were never
considered disjunctively by the Christians and St. Isidore's huste dis-
ceptare est iuste judicare dispensed with the Roman division of action in
a legal process into jus and judicium. Rather he bound together for the
administration of justice the jurisdictio, imperium, judicium which the
Roman jurists had considered distinct.70 We cannot stress too strongly
the efficacious influence of St. Augustine and St. Isidore at a time when
the City of God was the favorite reading of princes and the Etymologies
and Senteices were the encyclopedias of the political writers. St. Augus-
tine's general principles were channelled by St. Isidore into the structure
of the law of Christendom and their contest with the Roman law princi-
ples proved victoriously challenging as early as the Merovingian
dynasty.77
73. 3 SExNCES c. 51, § 1. This chapter is frequently referred to in later times and
embodied in the twelfth century in GRAq DEcRL=, DisT. LX, 2.
74. ETaoLosiEs 3. In one sense, the Isidorian dictum had more influence on the
Middle Ages than any other element of political doctrine. Hrabanus Maurus, Sedulius
Scotus, Jonas of Orleans, Cathulfus, and Hincmar of Rheims cited St. Isidore. The
distinctive evil of the tyrant is for St. Isidore what it was for St. Augustine cupidilas
dominandi.
75. Law for the Romans were certain fixed principles in the light of which interprela-
tiones were given. Jus was that which the State in effect allotted to the individual.
76. SijouNF, op. cit. supra note 62, at 64-6.
77. DEcLA EuTm, HlsTOmE GauRa=an nu DROIT FR cAis 111-2 (1925): "La souverain-
et6 royale et imperiale et ses nouveau fondements: La rvolution dynastique ne correspondit,
malgr6 qu'on l'ait pr~tendu, ni a une r6action germanique, ni a une novelle invasion, mais a
une renaissance partielle des ides romaines. Accomplie sous le patronage de PEglise,
elk imprima a la souverainet9 des caractires nouveau. Celle-ci cessait d'etre tn domrnium
et devenait un ministerium: le roi gouvernait d&ormais pro uViitate reipublicae. Avec
une nuance plus chritienne, on se rapprochait de la conception du Bas- Empire. La
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b. Jonas of Orleans
In the writings of Jonas of Orleans, a medieval bishop of the ninth
century, we find striking evidence of the prevalance of the Augustinian-
Isidorian tradition amongst the medieval bishops and rulers. Though
there is no further development of the tradition in Jonas, the significance
of his two tracts, De Institutione Laicali and De Institutione RegaW'3 in
particular, take on added importance because they were written at
a time when feudalism was emerging as a social, political, economic pat-
tern of society and novel relations of dependence based on social and
economic inequalities multiplied. Jonas admonished the feudal lords
not to mistake the differences in "power, dignities, and riches" for a real
difference in nature. These inequalities have come to pass "by a Divine
disposition of Providence" in order that the stronger may provide for the
weaker. It is pride--ex fonte superbiae-which makes men forget this
fundamental truth.'9 His tract on the conduct of Christian princes re-
peats almost verbatim the formula of St. Isidore on the concept of the
king and tyrant.80 We find this statement of Jonas on the nature of
royautk, mi-s~culire, mi-ecclisiastique 6tait tenue & la fls pour diligation divine et
institution rationelle, ses buts Rait la paix et la justice en ce monde, le salut des ?nes
dans l'autre. La littorature monastique qualificat le roi de minister Dei, adopt6 au moment
du sacre par Dieu & qui 6tait le royaume et qui le donnait h qui lui plalsalt. Mais le
pouvoir souverain n'tait ligitime qu'exerc6 selon les vojes de Dieu et de l'Eglise; au cas
contraire, il devait 6tre retire; d'oi le contrble des iviques. Cependant, c'6talt la
notion fondamentale de l'Etat renaissait. L'imperium merovingien, identifi6 au dominlum,
itait arbitraire. La volont6 du Prince n'avait de limites que cellos qu'elle s-imposalt
en vue de son intirit qui soul, en maintenant cette volont6 stable, en falsalt la lol. Ds
lors, le Prince ne pouvait se concevoir dans un rapport de droit, entre quo priv6, avec
une pdrsonalite quelconque; il n'y avait pas de droit public. L'imperium carollnglen n'est
plus arbitraire, mais &xerci selon des r gles de droit qui enclosent dans un champ donne
sa puissance de commander. ll ne crie pas ces ragles, it les reqoit des croyances moraics
et religicuse du temps; il les reconnait d leur conformiti an but que lit est assignj. II y
a un droit public."
78. JONAS OF ORIEANS, MIGNE PATROLOGIA LATINA Vol. 106.
79. DE INsTrrunioNE LAICAU 22: "Those who are in authority should take care not
to think those subject to them to be inferior by nature as they are by rank, for by a
Divine disposition of Providence it has been brought to pass that one mortal man Is
defended by another mortal man, but by a certain rank in this life, as when a weak
man is defended by a strong man through a proper authority in government, yet in such
a manner that he is always recognized as equal by nature. Though this s so, many
swollen with goods doomed to perish and soon slip away from them do not acknowledge
as their equals by nature either those over whom they are in authority or those whom
they excel in power and dignities and riches. And if they do not admit it in words, still
they do not admit it in their attitude towards them. It is clear that this vice has its
source in pride. For why are master and slave, rich and poor, not equal by nature, who
have in heaven one and the same God, Who is not a respector of persons?"
80. DE INsTrr=TioNE REGAi 3: "A King (rex) is called such from ruling rightly
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the true king reproduced in an address presented by the bishops to
Louis the Pious in the year 829.81
c. Hincmuar of Rhcims
In the writings of a great contemporary of Jonas of Orleans, Hincmar,
Archbishop of Rheims and counsellor of Charles the Bald, we have, after
St. Isidore's analysis of the material content necessary for the justice of
the law-a further advance in the doctrine of the supremacy of tem-
poral law with explicit reference to St. Augustine. As ever the principle
of equality appears fundamental not only as the theoretic but also as
the legal point of view of governance.
"St. Augustine in the book 'De Vera Religione shows that the laws of the princes
are to be observed, saying: 'In the case of those temporal laws, although men may
judge of them when they enact them, once they are enacted and confirmed it is no
longer a judge's part to judge of them but only according to them.' Therefore jse,
laws promulgated by the people are either to be observed or to be enforced justly
and reasonably by the prince against every one without distinction."8 2
Equality before the law is unmistakably inferred from the supremacy
of law as resting upon the consent of equals. But by far the strongest
expression of this doctrine appears in Hincmar's treatise De Ordine Pal-
latii (A.D. 882) where the relation of the king to the law, and of the
proximate source of the authority of the ruler is presented in such a way
as to serve, we think, as the first summary presentation of the funda-
mental principles of government according to constitutional limitation.
Hincmar begins the eighth chapter of this work by a reference to a rule
that no priest must be ignorant of the canons, and then observes that in
like manner the sacred laws, meaning the Lex Romana Visigothorum,
decree that no one may be ignorant of the law or act contrary to its
decrees. Since this admits of no exception, the kings and their ministers
must rule according to the law of the land in which they have jurisdic-
tion. They are bound by the capitydaries of their predecessors, "quac
generali consensu fidelium suorum (tenere) legaliter promidgaveunt '8
(recto regendo), for if he rules piously, justly, and mercifully he is properly called king.
If he lacks these (virtues) he loses the name of king. The ancients called all kings tyrants,
but later those who ruled piously, justly, and mercifully acquired the name of kings,
while those who lorded it impiously or unjustly and cruelly had the name tyrant and
not king applied to them."
81. MoNoiSzuiTA GERmwmE HisomcA, Aucro Es A.- Q mi mr, LtGEs, § 11, vol.
11, no. 196, EPISCOPORuaS AD HILuDovicu IxAn'n m oR RELuTmo 56.
82. HRuc=AaR or Rmmx, OPERA, Mci PATROLOrIA LA=A, DE REG Is Pznso.:;A Er
RGIO MrNrsmmIo, vols. 125-6, 27 (855).
83. 2 MONumENTA GEPwAIESI i HisroaRcA, LrGrm § 11, Dr Omnm PA.A=rx 8: "A king
ought to guard the dignity of his name in his own person; for the name of the king
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Two conclusions follow from this passage. The explicit reference to
the capitula is the specific norm of rule by law and is a definite historic
beginning in the evolution of constitutional governance. Secondly, the
reason alleged for the subordation of the prince to the positive law brings
out the growing significance of consent for the authority of law. Generali
consensu fidelium. Since, as St. Isidore insisted, the function of law is to
realize the public welfare, it follows that the ruler, the administrator of
law is bound to that purpose. Consent is the legal confirmation of the
ethical function of kingship and of the final cause of law. Further, if no
man by his nature has a natural right to rule others, it also follows as a
correlative that no one by his nature has the exclusive insight into the
true welfare of a people. Consequently, the function of making laws is
necessarily reserved for the community, since all the obligatory force
of laws flows proximately from the consent or implicit approval of equals
for whose good these laws exist. In other words, law both as a function
of jurisdiction and as an objective social truth must rest on the judgment
and approval of the people. The king shares with his subjects the re-
sponsibility of enacting law; but once it is promulgated generali consensu
that law enjoys a supremacy which defines both his administration and
process of adjudication. This conception of medieval political thought
is of the utmost importance in the development of due process and equal
protection before the law or simply, justice according to law approved
by the people and not according to the sole discretion of the ruler. As
A. J. Carlyle never tired of maintaining, the authority of the law in me-
dieval Christendom derived from the community, and secondly, justice
consisted in its administration according to the law.
A particularly significant fact discloses that the Augustinian-Isidorian
tradition had become a dominant doctrine amongst the rulers. Charles
the Bald, who had summoned Hincmar to appear before a secular court
taken intellectually holds that he manages the office of ruler for all those who are
subject. But how would he be able to correct others who did not correct his own ways
lest they become unjust? 'For the throne is established by the justice of the king' and
the government of peoples is strengthened by truth." (Hincmar then discusses the
knowledge priest should have of ecclesiastical law). And as it is declared concerning
ecclesiastical laws that "no priest should disregard his cations, nor is it permitted to any
to do what would offend against the rules of the Fathers," so in the sacred laws is it
decreed that "No one is to ignore the laws or condemn what is established," no person
whatever be his worldly rank, is excepted so as not to be bound by this judgment. Kings
and ministers of the commonwealth have laws according to which they dwell: they have
the capitula of Christian kings and of their progenitor which, with the general consent
of their faithful men they legally promulgated to be held. Concerning which the blessed
Augustine says, "Although men are allowed to judge of them at the time when they
enact them, nevertheless once they are enacted and confirmed it is not allowable for
judges to judge them, but in accordance with them."
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and passed sentence upon him in his absence, received as an answer
Hincmar's judgment that this action was contrary not only to the canons
as to the relation of ecclesiastical and secular courts, but also contrary
to the laws of the emperors. Yet Charles had himself written to Pope
Adrian in 875 in almost the same words:
"The holy canons are founded on the Spirit of God and rendered inviolate by the
religious regard of the whole world, and as the blessed Ambrose says to Valentinian,
'The emperor enacts laws which you should be the first to keep, since what he
prescribes for others he prescribes for himself, lest freedom be granted to another
to judge differently.' And the blessed Augustine says that, 'After the laws have been
subscribed to and confirmed it is not allowable for a judge to judge of them but in
accordance with them.' "S4
It is clear how the doctrine of revelation on the equality of men as
applied by St. Augustine to the juridical order was in fact a guiding prin-
ciple in the construction of the Pax Christiana.s
2. LEGAL TESTIMONY
a. Law of the Visigoths
In speaking of "tradition," we designate two constitutive elements as
the test of its viability and prevalence; namely, that its doctrinal ideas
are repeatedly taught and accepted as primary principles, and secondly,
that these ideas become the directive factors in the actualities of the social
order. An incontestable concrete expression of the evidence of such an
influence'is the law of the country. We have selected instances of the in-
fluence of St. Augustine's political principles upon three ecclesiastical
leaders who were counsellors of kings and princes. It remains to be
seen if this influence was translated into legal forms.
The outstanding practical achievement of St. Isidore's influence is the
Law of the Visigoths known also as the Forum Judicum. Its beginning
and development since the days of Euric (467-485) are very intricate
and somewhat obscure. 6 But in the days of St. Isidore (560-636) and
especially at the Fourth Council of Toledo (633) at which he presided,
this legislation was marked with his Christian principles of law and gov-
ernance, and in its final promulgation by Recceswinth at the Eighth Coun-
cil of Toledo (653) we have the first Christian Constitution. Through
84. MIGNF, col. 892, vol. 124.
85. FiGGis, PoLITcAL Asprcrs or ST. AUGUsrn-'s Crry or GoD 86 (1921): "We have
ample evidence that the influence of Augustine was not merely an universally pervading
force in the Middle Ages, but was consciously adopted and felt."
86. See GENvRAL SuRsEy or CONTnzEN TAL LaA,%L HsroRy, Part VII (1912); V Cmm-




St. Isidore, the ideas of St. Augustine supplanted in great measure prin-
ciples of law and governance which the Romans and Teutons had brought
to the Ibernian peninsula. The Forum JudicumT is the most palpable
historical evidence in contradiction of an assumption commonly made
that the Roman tradition remained unbroken throughout the whole me-
dieval era. No one could rightly question that the Western legal world
was historically conditioned by Roman Civil Law and the Teutonic tribal
law. The former laid undue stress upon the sovereign will from which
the content as well as the promulgation of the law was supposed entirely
to derive. This constituted the formalism, viz., the subjectivism and ex-
trinsicism, of Roman juridicalism, 8 which, as we have seen, St. Isidore
corrected by prescribing the objective presuppositions of legislative
power. The Germanic people on the other hand, understood their law,
which was preeminently immemorial custom law, to be a personal attri-
bute unconfined by territorial boundaries. It was inevitable in the amal-
gamation of Germanic and Roman communities in the Ibernian peninsula
during the seventh and eighth centuries, consequent to the migrations
of the earlier century, that German legal personalism and Roman juridi-
cal voluntarism would merge in the interests of peaceful survival and
under stress of administrative exigencies into territorial custom law.
Authoritarianism thus clung to the vestiges of the imperium by forcibly
recognizing (what it seemed to confer benignly) the ineradicable, socio-
logical actuality of the exaggerated personalism of barbaric custom. We
do not mean to depreciate the positive elements of both these systems of
law, such as the rudimentary constitutionalism of Teutonic custom law
and certain aspects of plenitudo potestatis of Roman sovereign power,
87. References are to the VisicoTmc CODE (Scott transl. 1910).
88. DE LAGAViDE, REHCsHS SuR L'EspviT POIUTIQUE DE LA REroaRE 15-6 (Picard's
transl. 1926): "La tradition romaine, feconde en principes de technique juridlque, availt ) sa
base une philosophie un peu courte. Peu portis & la speculation, les grands juristes, dont los
glossateurs retrouvaient la pens~e dans le Digeste, ne s'etaient pas attardks aux d6velopments
sur l'origine et la nature du Droit. Quelques essais tenths dans ce sens so trouvalent ch
et 1M. Tel le texte d'Ulpien: Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique
tribuendi." Digest, 1, 10. "Telles encore les definitions hisitantes que le memo autcur
donne ailleurs du droit naturel 'jus naturae est quad natura omnia animalia docuil. Mals
en fait les juristes donnaient le plus souvent du Droit une notione toute formelle. Lo
consentement du Peuple, ou la volont6 du Prince (a qui ]a souverainete commune avalt
kt diliguie) suffiait A donner au droit sa forme et sa vigeur. Et lorsque l'on voulalt
exalter la vertu de la loi, on pensait qu'il etait suffisant de montrer cn ello touto la
'majeste' du 'Feuple Romain' .... La theorie permettait d'expliquer Ia notion bfttarde do
coutume. En elle survivait le pouvoir lJgislatif de la communaut6. Ce Ce souvoir souvalt-il
contredire celui que le Prince exercait en vertu d'une delegation plus anclenne? On en
discutait. Mais la pens& tournait toujours dans lae mime cercie dtroit. On s'attachalt
surtout A l'origine ext&ieure et formelle du droit pour en d~finir la portke."
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when we underscore their essentially radical deficiencies. For the Chris-
tian jurists assimilated what was sound in both systems, corrected and
complemented what was partially acceptable, and rejected whatever con-
travened incontrovertible truths about law and society. But we do con-
tend that medieval law was neither dominantly Roman nor dominantly
Teutonic but distinctly Christian in principle and, in actuality, ever
more Christian as the Christian transformation of the social order pro-
gressed to the historic unity of Christendom. The Law of the Visigoths
is the outstanding major achievement in the transference of Christian
principles to legislation in early medieval legal history.
A summary analysis of this code discloses how the two traditions,
Roman and Christian, were recognized as antithetical, and though there
was a partial confluence, their basic principles were clearly appreciated
and not compromised. Rarely does it happen that a law of ancient or
medieval times, is preceded by a doctrine on the origin and nature of
power, the finis and virtues of law, and a disquisition on the rights and
duties of the legislator. The authors of the Law of the Visigoths set down
principles, and converted into law philosophical truths and evangelical
rules of social relations.
The most important part of the Liber ludiciorum from the point of
view of legal philosophy is the Primus Titulus, De Electione principum,
and Book 1 containing the titles on the Legislator and the Law. There is
an unwritten, eternal, universal law, fully known to God and which the
human legislator seeks after. Human law is good only in so far as it is
the emulator and messenger of the divine law. The source of the
legitimacy of laws is not to be found on earth; and this legitimacy
originates, not in the will of him or them who make the laws,
whoever they may be, but in the conformity of the laws themselves to
truth, reason and justice-which constitutes the true law. The character
of law is to be universal, the same for all men, foreign to all private in-
terests, given solely for the common interest.P On the other hand, it was
the characteristic of the other Barbarian codes that they were conceived
for the furtherance of the private interest, either of individuals or classes
and, consequently, their system of laws consisted of privileges, privatae
leges. The councils of Toledo corrected this legal individualism by ap-
plying the principle of equality to the realm of public law. Thus, the
Law of the Visigoths was, at this period, the only one that could be called
lex publica. Under the influence of the unity of faith accomplished at
the Third Council of Toledo (589), the unity and universality of a law
common to all the inhabitants of the Peninsula supplanted with greater
89. Fo nur JuDicim 5 (Scott's transl. 1910).
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ease the racial legislation peculiar to the Goths and the Romans. Far
are we from suggesting that valid contributions of Roman law, which
St. Augustine admired for its iustitia civilis, were completely forsaken.
Rather, the Christian makers of the new Spanish State were ready to
recognize the usefulness of the study of Roman LawY0 But they refused
to subscribe to a confused mass of laws which, presumably, only the
select jurisperites could understand and interpret.
The first two books deserve our special attention for two reasons. First,
the two titles of Book 1, the Lawmaker and the Law are taken almost
bodily from Books II and V of the Etymologies of St. Isidore. Secondly,
both Book I, Concerning Legal Agencies, and Book II, Concerning the
Conduct of Causes, contain many expressions of the supremacy and uni-
versality of law, precepts for the immunity of the individual against ar-
bitrary action, regulations for due process and equal protection for all
-which bear striking similarity to the later memorable document of
Runnymede, the English Magna Charta. We select certain illustrations
of Visigoth Whiggism to indicate the historical likelihood of the indebt-
edness of the English document to our tradition as made viable in the
Ordinances of the Cortes of Castile and Leon of thirteenth century
Spain."
The bishops and the king were the only persons who could not per-
sonally defend their own cause, and who were bound to appear by proxy
in such cases, lest their personal presence should influence the decision
of the judge, "lest the fear of royal power should suppress the truth."' 2
"In rendering judgment, the judge 'should be no respecter of persons, and should
avoid all appearance of partiality.' "o3
"Laws as amended, and approved by us ...shall be binding thereafter upon all
persons subject to our empire, irrespective of rank."0 4
90. Id. at 20. The Christian interpolation of the useful elements in the Roman Law
(lev antiqua) was properly designated as the lev emendada.
91. ALTrzAiRA, Magna Carta and Spanish Medieval Jurisprudence, in MAGNA CARTA
CoMisamoRATioN EssAYs 227 (1917): "To an historian of Spanish Constitutional Law,
Magna Carta may offer two fundamental and extremely interesting questions. One Is
concerned with the analogy between the rights-political and civil-which are defined
in Magna Carta, and rights of the same king which are formulated it; contemporary or
earlier Spanish legislation; the two pictures may be compared as the results of a process
common to all the nations of Europe in the Middle Ages, results produced in two distinct
communities which were making their way towards the same end. The other question
has to do with the possibility that certain liberties and customs, belonging to Spain and
the adjoining lands, may have had some influence in the formation of the programme
which was imposed upon King John by the English Barons." Cf. id. at 228-9. (Italics
mine).
92. ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 89, at 47.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id. at 12.
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"The royal power, like the whole of the people, is bound to respect the laws. Obey-
ing the will of heaven, we give, to ourselves as well as to our subjects, wise laws,
which our own greatness and that of our successors is bound to obey, as are also
the whole population of our realm."' 5
"We decree that no king shall by any means, extort, or cause to be extorted, any
documents whatever in acknowledgment of any debt, whereby any person can un-
justly, and without his consent, be deprived of his property."30
"No one has a right to hear a cause which is not authorized by the laws."07
"It shall be lawful for no one to decide causes unless authorized either by the man-
date of the prince, or by the prince, or by the consent of the parties....,'98
"No one shall presume, either by decree, or by means of a bailiff, to imprison or
oppress any person, in any way, in a district over which he has not baen appointed,
or where he has no judicial authority, unless by the order of the king, or by the
agreement of the parties. .... 99
"The judge, when inquired of by a Party, should be able to give a reason for his
decision. 'Every judge is hereby admonished that if a demand is made upon him
by any one, he shall give the reasons, in their proper order, for the decision he
has made.' "100
Book 11, Title 11, Concerning the Conduct of Causes, restates the
necessary conditions for a just trial, namely, a clear and publicly known
law, personal presence at the trial, norms for testing the reliability of
testimony, written or oral. Any effort to influence fraudulently the jus-
tice of the case is severely censured and penalties attached. Equal pro-
tection before the law is clearly illustrated by the prescription that "no
freeman shall refuse to answer the slave of another in court." The only
adequate and compelling justification of the supremacy of the law is
the equality of men which may never be disregarded in any unequal rela-
tion which the social order may impose for their good. Thus did the
doctrine of the equality101 of men pass from religion to politics, from
95. Ibid.
96. Id. at 15.
97. Id. at 22.
98. Id. at 23.
99. Id. at 24.
100. Id. at 35.
101. A striking instance of how Christianity applied the new doctrine of the equality
of men to mean equal protection before the law and due process appears in the treat-
ment of slaves as compared with the meaningless humanitarianism of the enlightened
Roman Stoics. FoRu1- JuTDicuTi: "If any one who is guilty or accomplice of a crime should
not remain unpunished, how much more should those be punished who have committed
homicide wickedly and with levity. Thus, as cruel masters, in their pride, frequently put
to death their slaves without any fault on their part, it is fitting altogether to extirpate
this license, and to ordain that the present law shall be externally observed by all. No
master or mistress may, without a public trial, put to death any of their male or female
slaves, or any person dependent upon them. If a slave, or any other servant, commit
a crime which may lead to his capital condemnation, his master or accuser shall im-
mediately give information thereof to the judge of the place where the action was corn-
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the Gospel to the codes. It is to the credit of the Visigothic bishops to
have given this doctrine its first significant embodiment in the juridical
order.
The law of the Visigoths is the first historical record of the promulga-
tion of a national law based explicitly on the profession of Christian
principles. It was the work of the clergy and to them belongs the credit
for the formulation not only of principles but of detailed prescriptions
covering the whole range of human conduct in a clear, definite, rational,
and humane spirit which their Faith inspired. No pagan or barbarian
legislation had ever founded the true good of the individual or of society
on such a sound basis and on such lofty motives. Heretofore Christian
ethics had governed the relation between master and slave. The Visi-
gothic Code placed those relations, particularly those that refer to life
and limb, on a juridical plane. A Christian law which had begun to
elaborate itself'0° in the half Roman half Christian Theodosian Code
now rested entirely on its own Christian premises.
b. Carolingian Capitularia
As for the practical influence of Jonas of Orleans and Hincmar of
Rheims, their writings give testimony of a tradition already accepted in
the political order and which they repeatedly defended on the basis of
the Christian principles underlying it. Jonas of Orleans simply attested
to the prevalence of our tradition. In Hincmar, the lawful society of
mitted, or to the count, or to the duke. After the discussion of the affair, if the crime
be proved, let the culprit suffer, either by sentence of the judge, or of his master, the
punishment of death which he has deserved; in such sort, however, that if the Judge will
not put the culprit to death, he shall draw up a capital sentence against him, in writing,
and then it shall be in the power of the master to kill him or to keep him in life. In
truth, if the slave, by a fatal boldness while resisting his master, has struck him or
attempted to strike him with a weapon, or a stone, or by any other blow, and If the
master in self-defense has killed the slave in his anger, the master shall in no wise suffer
the punishment of homicide. But he must prove that this was the case; and he must
prove it by the testimony of oath of the slaves, both male and female, who were present
at the time, and by the oath of himself, the author of the deed. Whoever, from pure
wickedness and by his own hand or that of another shall have killed his slave without
bringing him to public trial, shall be branded with infamy, declared incapable of giving
evidence, and doomed to pass the rest of his life in exile and penitence; and his property
shall be given to his nearest relatives, to whom the law grants an inheritance." Foav
JuDicum Bk. V, Crimes and Torts, Tit. V, Homicide § xii at 222: the vital question of
intent, or the existence or pre-existence of malice prepense is Christianity's contribution
to the point at law-of guilt and the degree of crime. Cf. id., Bk. VI, Title D, Section
xiii at 225: "No one shall deprive a male or female slave of a limb." (Italics mine).
102. See TROPLONG, DE L'INLuENcE Du C smisTIAuSaia SUR LE DROIT CIVIL DEs




the Ibernians acquired a legal status. The passage from De Ordine Palatii
refers to an existing situation. Kings and ministers of the commonwealth
have laws by which they must rule the inhabitants of every province.
These laws are the laws of the place through which they pass. Besides,
they must observe the capitzdaries of the Christian kings and their prede-
cessors because their legal character derived from the general consent of
the faithful. The meaning is unmistakable. The king is no more entitled
than any person to ignore the law. His duty is to carry out the law
because it is not merely his law, nor is it merely by his will that it has
been made. Nothing could sound more startling to the Roman Em-
peror,"'3 who normally was in his own person the direct source of
law, nor anything more perplexing to the Roman governor than to be
subject to the laws of the province. This passage from Dc Ordine
Palatii immediately precedes the citation on the supremacy of law from
St. Augustine's treatise, De Vera Religione. This citation was Hincmar's
favorite for he uses it in his defense against the action of Charles the
Bald and again in the De Regis Persona.
In the ninth century the prevalent laws were popular customs and
kings were required from time to time to reiterate their intention to
rule accordingly. But gradually, a deliberate process of law-making mani-
fested itself particularly in the effort to adapt existing laws to changing
circumstances. Consequently, any effort to amend or improve upon a law
was a matter of popular concern. Consent did not simply mean agree-
ment with the king; the medieval notion of consent was far more signifi-
cant. The king and the people, represented somehow vaguely but truly
so in the wise and noble men, together promulgated the law so that it
took on the nature of a pact.104
103. BucxrLAw Aw Mc' ut, Roa n LAW &N-D CommOn Ivtw 7 (1936): "The Emperor
was a legislator with a free hand and he could lay down the law in any way he saw fit.
Whether he decided a point in general enactment or in the course of the hearing of a
case, what he said was law. Thus, though there are cases in our books (English Iaw)
which definitely break with a pre-existing law and introduce absolutely new principles, in
general, each decision is only a step forward on a way already marked out. But the
decreta of the Emperor are under no such limitations. We have remains of some collections
of decreta from which it is plain that the Emperor often establishes what he thinks
a salutary rule without reference to its relation to an earlier law .... We ought not to
say that decisions were binding if they were by the Emperor, but that what the Empzror
laid down was law even if it were merely in a decision."
104. 1 lo-NruENTA Gm-zLuAL HisroI cA 115 (1925): Capitula Minora art. 19.
Charlemagne's instructions to his missi in 803: "Let the people be questioned concerning
the capiula, lately added to the law, and after all have consented, let them affix their
writing and subscriptions to the capitula themselves." Cf. nIIXS.NTA GEmran,
Hs=cA: Capitula Quae in Lege Salica Mittenda Sunt. art. 803, 112; Ctrr ruRE AQUzs-
GRPmENF, art. 813, 187.
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In the Edictum Pistense of Charles II (864), we find an explicit and
formal definition of the joint action of the king and the nation in making
laws.
Quoniam lex consensu populi et constitutione regis fit'0°-a phrase
full of significance for the development of constitutional government
when it is taken in its proper connection with the general tendencies of
the Christian tradition. The general notion of the supremacy of law
as required by the principle of equality and its correlative, the consent
of the governed, became clearer as the changing conditions of the
Middle Ages made deliberate modification of immemorial customs in-
evitable. Such action could only be taken with the assent, expressed or
tacit, of the community represented in some way in the responsible mem-
bers of the community, the bishops and the nobles. Even at that, public
acclamation was not wanting. Nor are we to look down upon these popu-
lar expressions. The word populus, and fidelibus omnibus appear un-
failingly after the words communi consilio. The consent of the subjects
was also necessary in order that a hereditary succession be valid. A for-
tiori, it was required for the candidates not of the line of succession.
In both instances, the consent gradually crystallized into a commitment
in justice based on specific conditions so that the Isidorian si rex eris
implied a more definite meaning than heretofore.
In 817, Louis the Pious convened his people, and after a three day
fast his eldest son, Lothair, was elected by Louis and the whole people
to rule the empire.' Then by common counsel, the title of king was
given to the two younger sons and lands allotted to them according to
specific conditions listed in the capitula. The document is then signed
by Louis and all his faithful because-and there follows a principle
of action which is to forward considerably the development of consti-
tutional government_-"what is done by all might b'e held inviolable by
all." In the latter part of the ninth century, we find not only the princi-
ple of election very clearly retained, but we can also discern more insist-
ent exactions of avowals for the supremacy of law as a necessary condi-
tion prior to the election of the ruler. When Charles the Bald succeeded
to the kingdom of Italy in 876, an exchange of promises and conditions
for the faithful observance of law are made by subjects and king.'
Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, who had consecrated the crowned
Charles' successor, had occasion to remind Louis
vos elegi ad regimen regni,
sub conditione debitas leges servandi.108
105. M. G. H., KAROLI II EDICTuM PISTENSa 490.
106. M. G. H., DVisiO 1IPERnii art. 817, 198.
107. M. G. H., KAow II CoNvaN1Tus TcNmENss 528.
108. HncINMAR, EP. XX.
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The custom of stating conditions on which the elections are made take
on an added significance when we find the rulers reiterating their prom-
ises to abide by those conditions in the effort to retain the allegiance of
their subjects since that allegiance depends on the mutual fulfillment of
these conditions. In 851 Lothair, Louis, and Charles met at 'Mersen to
reassure their subjects of their intention to administer justice according
to law, whatever the rank or condition of the subject."' Then follow
expressions for the immunity against arbitrary action which foreshadow
the language of the English Magna Carta.
Henceforth we will not condenmn or disluwwr or oppress anyone in riolation of
thre law, justice, authority, and right reason, nor will we burden anyone with unjust
scizemings.
These assurances are repeatedly made with enlarged implicates. Two
ideas, which were to become paramount in feudal times, are evolving;
first, the notion that allegiance depends on the fulfillment of mutual
obligations; secondly, whoever acts illegally places himself outside of
the law.
In the Carolingian Capitularia there is ample evidence of the growing
recognition of the significance of consent as related to the promulgation
of law and validity of a king's title to govern. Both add up to the Rule
by Law which will through the centuries be the principle involved in the
numerous struggles for constitutional government. This growing Chris-
tian tradition which superseded the purely Roman and primitive Gothic
understanding and practices of law and governance in the newly created
Christian State in Spain was just as successful and probably more so in
the Frankish kingdoms. Certainly, Charlemagne labored energetically
for the unity of a Christian society. This is abundantly apparent in the
superabundant references to Christian motives of love of God and
neighbor, which for Charlemagne as for St. Augustine, meant justice in
the larger meaning of Christian charity. His Capitida and the instruc-
tions as to his inissi doininici insisted on the administraton of justice ac-
cording to equity, which in those days, infused Christian virtue into the
legal formula. The Christian rulers gave to the Teutonic people that
which their customs and traditions lacked. They supplied sound politi-
cal ideas and principles with which the Teutonic people could justify
their native sense of popular government and, further, be able intelli-
gently to account for any just resistance against arrogant exercise of
authority. Genuine possibilities of sound development of constitutional
rule became in the Frankish states a greater reality than it had ever
been before.




c. Assizes of Jerusalem
The great central period of medieval civilization, the tenth to the thir-
teenth century comprised the so-called Dark Ages when European civi-
lization was threatened by a second wave of barbarian invasions and was
equally distinguished for the resurgence of Christian spirit made mani-
fest in the Crusades. The victory of Alfred over the Danes, of Otto the
Great at the Lecfeld over the Magyars, and the limits within which the
Norse invasion of France was finally contained, revealed the innate vigor
of Christian society to which, as the Normans who settled North-western
France proved, the barbarians had to accommodate themselves. This
was so unlike the crumbling of the Roman Imperium which the fore-
fathers of the Franks and the Visigoths had wrought five centuries earlier
in the times of St. Augustine. The feudal tenure was as much a conse-
quence of the confused factional strifes which contributed to the disso-
lution of the-Carolingian Empire as it was a retrenchment against the
perils of the barbarian transmigration. These new times brought new
conditions, new and important forms of political and social relationships.
We are not here directly concerned with the political, economic struc-
ture of the feudal hierarchical society. But we will examine the moral
notions and principles upon which these relationships were founded and
were regulated accordingly. The records of the feudal law books, such
as the Assizes of Jerusalem, the writings of the contemporary lawyers,
Bracton and Beaumanoir, and of the first Christian political philoso-
phers, John of Salisbury and St. Thomas Aquinas, should provide ade-
quate evidence on the three levels of theory, practice, and the interpre-
tation of contemporary society, for the discernment of the principles
underlying and operating in that society. In this wise, we will observe
if the hypothesis we hope to vindicate was legitimately assumed, namely,
that the Augustinian-Isidorian tradition was rather promoted than sus-
pended by the novel social configuration; indeed, its broad principles
and large implicates were elicited to more expansive logical evolutions.
It asserted clearer and more firmly than before the inviolability of the
rights of individuals, of the weak and insignificant as well as of the
strong, of equal rights to unequal objects, of an obedience contingent
for its legitimacy upon the mutual fulfillment of obligations, of an equali-
ty of nature unprejudiced and uncompromised by economic and social
inequalities. In a word, it established the supremacy of the feudal bi-
lateral contract as the historic prelude toward the evolution of medieval
constitutionalism and toward the formulation of a sound social contract
theory.
The Assizes of Jerusalem constitute a remarkable and, in some re-
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spects, unique evidence of the growing appreciation that the supremacy
of law must be translated from doctrinal formulas into concrete juridical
forms the better to secure their professed virtues. This it does in regard
to two things, which, of their very nature, are juridically interdepen-
dent, namely, constitutionalism and the judiciary. The supremacy of
the law is expressed in the bilateral contract of the fief, and secondly,
that the supremacy of law is in practice commensurate with the inde-
pendent uncompromised judiciary process. Though at first considera-
tion it would seem that the separatist pattern of feudal tenure was op-
posed to the development of a unified national governance still, para-
doxically as it may appear, it emphasized and strengthened such prac-
tices as would provide substantial precedents for constitutional history.
Thus, for example, medieval feudalism fixed both rights and obligations
to such an extent as never to confuse or compromise them arbitrarily
in the most vivid and chivalrous sentiments of personal loyalty and de-
votion of vassal to lord. In effect it spelt equality before the law while
at the same time it enhanced the reverence for authority as a sacred trust
for the administration of justice. This is admirably expressed in the
Assizes of the Court of Burgesses of Jerusalem:
"La dame ni le sire n'en est seignor se tn dou dreit.... Mais biet sacides q11l
W'est mie seignor de faire tort."" 0
The authority of the lady or of the lord is only an authority to do law
(or justice). They do not have authority for wrong doing. This is a
conclusion of a passage which warns the king and queen against inter-
fering with the execution of a judgment obtained in court. For they
have sworn to observe the customs of the kingdom and to assure the
rights of the poor as well as of the rich. If the lord should break his
oath and refuse to administer justice and law to his people, they are not
to permit this. Et ne l'deivent soufrir ces homes ni le peuple. This is
but an echo of the Capitula of Charles II ad Francos et Aquitanos Missa
De Carisiaco. The feudal lawyers insisted that supremacy of law does
not actually exist unless both lord and vassals are equally subject to the
adjudications of the courts. Neither lord nor vassal could take the
matter into his own hands, but must submit his complaint to the court,
and abide by its decision. No one was a judge in his own cause. Conse-
quently, the supremacy of law exists in practice to the extent that the
courts are not subject to interference on the part of the ruler. The law
of the Visigoths recognized this principle when it prescribed that no
person or power, ruler or bishop, should appear in person but through
a representative in a process which concerned them, lest their presence
110. AssIss DE LA Coun DEs BOURGEOIs 26.
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influence the judgments of the court. Feudal law sought to secure
equality before the law by the practice of judgment by peers and by the
support given by one's peers. Should a lord refuse to answer a vassal's
complaint in the court, the vassal may have recourse to his peers to
compel the lord to comply; or should the lord accept the court pro-
cedure and refuse to abide by its decision, the vassals are to renounce
their service till justice is done. This pertains equally in the instance of
a lord who fails to comply in a judgment in the favor of a man who is not
his vassal. Should a lord put his vassal in prison without the judgment
of the court, his peers will first peacefully seek his release or the judg-
ment of the court. That failing, all are to renounce their service. In
the Assizes of Jerusalem, the negative consequences of a lord's refusal to
do justice to his vassal according to the law and the judgment of the
court, was limited to the refusal on the part of the peers of the wronged
vassal to discharge their services and feudal obligations. The equality
of men by nature was explicitly alleged as the basis for the equality
before the law, according to the rights and duties established by their
society. For the authors of the Assizes, justice meant the supremacy of
law, and the supremacy of law meant judgment by the members of the
feudal court. In the gradual independence of the courts we have one
of the most effective expressions of constitutional governance. In the
judgment by peers and the recognized necessity of removing the court
proceedings from the arbitrary influence of the lord we have the early
intimations of the development of the institutional jury system. The
law of the land meant due process of law, and the feudal oath which
succeeded to the coronation oath retained its primary objective of abid-
ing by the law of the land.
2. FEUDAL LAWYERS
a. Bracton
A striking fact about the history of the Roman and Christian tradi-
tion is that the survival of one or the other has depended in great meas-
ure upon the lawyers. In England, the Christian tradition prevailed by
reason of a deliberate and prudent mastery of Roman law. In France,
Spain, and Germany, Roman law was "received," that is to say, it was
forcibly imposed upon the people, by the lawyers who preferred to serve
their king with the teaching of the Bolognese school rather than protect
the liberties of their people embodied in their common law. It was at
an opportune period in English history that Henry of Bracton wrote De
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae for the instruction of men who
aspired to be justices. By using Roman law maxims, which could be
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referred to sound reasoning and by appropriating their technical language
and divisions of law,"' Bracton gave a definite form to the native English
Common Law, which at a later century would in turn fortify England
from being Romanized in doctrine at the very time the Roman Recep-
tion was to prevail on the Continent.
"Thus English law was saved from Romanism; by this we lost much-but we
gained much. The loss, we may say, was juristic; if our lawyers had known more
of Roman law, our law-in particular our land law-would never have become the
unprincipled labyrinth that it became-the gain, we may say, was constitutional,
was political-Roman law here as elsewhere would sooner or later have brought
absolutism in its train."1 2
English Common law, once it was firmly established by its own "form,"
was further strengthened by the legislation of Edward I, and, conse-
quently, any chances of the romanization of English law were seriously
diminished. English resistance to the Reception was due more to this
form-setting of the Christian principles of law which Bracton achieved
rather than to the Year Books, which, by recording rules of precedents,
channeled the fundamental principles of our tradition. The consequence
was that at the end of the thirteenth century, the English courts were
no longer staffed by men learned in "utroque iure." After the times
of Bracton, Englishmen found their legal studies in their own case laws
and precedents and deliberately avoided "the alien law."
Bracton explicitly and repeatedly warned his country against a literal
acceptance of the maxims of Roman jurisprudence. The Christian king,
precisely because he is the servant of God's authority, must rule accord-
111. 2 HoLsnswoam, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 284-6 (1922-25). See SouncEs
AsN LrmaATur oF ENGLIM LAW 29 (1925): "The Treatise consists of an introductory
part, much influenced by Roman law, in which the Roman division of the law into the
law of persons, things, and actions is put forward as a primary division. But this is a
very small part of the Treatise. . . . The extent of Bracton's debt to Roman law has
given rise to much controversy. But I think that we can say this: though it is true that
the greater part of the Treatise consists of a body of thoroughly English rules, it kan
hardly be denied that Bracton used Roman terms, ma.ims, and Roman doctrines to
zonjstruct, upon native foundations, a reasonable system of law out of comparatively
meagre authorities. Roman law supplied him with the intellectual outlook and the
technical language, which enabled him to mould native rules into a reasonable system."
mcLwAm, Co wsTrUToNAI.is= AI-CMINT =D MOomN 63 (1947): "Trying to state in
general terms ... what was Bracton's debt to civilians we may put it thus:-First he
had learned certain wide principles of jurisprudence, had found some of the highest
premises of all civilized law expressed in neat and accurate phrases. For these, at least
for some of these, the England of his time was ripe. They arc not he argued, specifically
Roman; the Romans themselves regarded them as common to all mankind; they are
dictates of reason implicit in all law."
112. MWTLAND, THE CoNsTITsuTiorA. HIsr OF ENr.A=m 21-2 (1919).
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ing to the law. This is not merely a consistency with his own will, as
Ulpian's phrase "quod principi placet, legis vigorem habet," meant in
the Institutes, but as Professor Mcllwainn a has rightly observed,
Bracton deliberately converted a plain statement of "absolutism into
an assertion of constitutionalism." That which the king wills has
the force of law because it has been promulgated after due delib-
eration, with the counsel of great men, in accordance with a lex
regis which had been made. "This passage in Bracton follows immedi-
ately upon a quotation of the English coronation oath," as Mcllwain
observes, "and serves as a commentary on it." Bracton's legal emenda-
tion of the lex regia is not an accidental gloss but a deliberate Christian
adaptation. The king is subject to God and the law because the law
made him king. Since by nature he has no title to rule over others, the
source of his kingship is in the designs of God and the law of his sub-
jects. And his formula, "there is no king where will and not the law
dominates" is but a reiteration of St. Isidore's si rex eis, which Bracton
quotes in confirmation of his position. These are not mere theoretic
aspirations. The age of Bracton was one in which such fundamental
questions as the relation of the king to the law was a burning issue.
His own times coincided with the critical period between the Magna
Charta and the defeat of Simon Montfort. It mattered considerably
whether the lawyers would subscribe to the Roman authorities, and hold
the view that the common law was the king's law or retain the Christian
tradition that law is a rule of conduct independent of the king-thus
making the law the bond uniting the various parts of the body politic.
The answer given would be of tremendous historical consequence for it
was the period of transition from medieval feudalism to the beginnings
113. McILwAni, op. cit. supra note 111, at 70-2: "Where the former (Justinian) says
the prince's will has the force of a lex 'because' (cum) the people by a lex regla have
conceded to him the whole of their authority, Bracton says it has the force of a law
'in accordance with a lex regia (cum lege regia) which had been made.' In the Institutes
the cum is a particle introducing a clause which gives merely an historical reason for
a complete and arbitrary authority actually in the emperor; whereas in our Bractonlan
text the cum is a proposition governing a noun in the ablative. . . .No doubt Bracton
was acquainted with the true wording of the original text, and his own book is conclusive
proof of his skill in the Latin tongue; and yet our text of Bracton, in quoting this plain
statement of absolutism, turns into an "assertion of constitutionalism. . . . So far as I
recall, attention has never been drawn to the significant fact that this passage in Bracton
follows immediately upon a quotation of the English coronation oath and serves as a
commentary on it. . . .But it is no lex regia which, like that of the Institute$, conei
on the prince the people's entire authority. On the contrary, it limits any authorlity the
prince may have to acts in conformity with its solemn promises. .. ." Cf. id. at 158 n, 9:




of national unity. Whatever answer was given to the principle under-
lying common law would determine the sort of popular sovereignty that
would develop in England-that of Ulpian or of Christian tradition.
In Bracton's summation of the medieval tradition, the king's ministers
did their work not merely as royal deputies depending solely on the
king, but as the dispensers of a law which should bind all within the
realm-king and subject alike.
"It was an idea which came naturally to the judges of the courts who were born
in the atmosphere of ideas which conceived of the law as declared by the court, and
not by the king or lord whose court it was. And so it happened that in no branch of
the law were Ronan doctrines vwre decisively rejected. In no branch of the law
did the older ideas as to the nature of the law and as to the powers and position
of the court more signally triumph."" 4
In Bracton's exposition of the sound nature of law as embodied by
England's "unwritten" or custom law, the traditional reason for the
supremacy of law over king and subjects is reasserted. That has the
force of law which is set out and approved with the counsel and consent
of the great men, and the general approval of the commonwealth, and
by the authority of the king. And again, in words so like those of St.
Augustine, when these laws have been approved by the custom of those
concerned (utentium), and by the oath of the king, they cannot be ab-
rogated or changed without the consent of all those by whose counsel
and consent they were made. But what if the king refused to obey the
law? This is a question which every medieval lawyer and political
philosopher must ponder in any serious consideration of the supremacy
of law or rule by law. It was an abstract question of political science.
The real difficulty of the matter lay, as we see it, in the fact that their
principles of law and government, being truly principles and not mere
theories, were far ahead of the actual development of institutions which
must embody the guarantees for those human values which those princi-
ples declare inviolable. In the eleventh century, Manegold spoke of
deposing the ruler who had broken his contract and this teaching was a
great advance over the former, namely, that the ruler had to give an
account of his rule to God. John of Salisbury in the twelfth century
defended the lawfulness of slaying the tyrant. The authors of the
Assizes of Jerusalem spoke of refusing to discharge any of their feudal
obligations to the lord who failed to do justice to his vassel according to
the law and the judgment of the court. But the underlying principle
is the same. The king is subject to God and the law of the land.




When we turn from Bracton to his contemporary, Beaumanoir, the
greatest of the French feudal lawyers, we find the traditional ideas of the
"rule of law" expressed in the feudal system in terms of reciprocal rights
and duties, further advanced by an insistence on suitable judicial ma-
chinery.
Beaumanoir testified, like Bracton, to the transition in France from
feudalism to a national governance. The desire to do away with serfdom
and the distinction drawn between the laws promulgated by a king for
the whole realm as distinct from those given as a feudal lord discloses
the new political awakening of France occasioned in no small part by the
Crusades. When the "establissemens" are made for the whole kingdom,
let the king make sure they are made for a reasonable cause, for the
common good, and with serious consultations: r "par reasonable cause,
et pour le common pourfit, et par grant conseil."
The rule of law is to be secured by an independent process of adjudi-
cating and by equality before the law. In a dispute between the whole
body of the vassals and their lord, the court of vassals cannot be judge;
nor in a dispute between a single vassal and the lord is the case decided
by the lord but by the court of the vassal's peers. 10 In either instance
no one or group is the judge of its own cause. In a serious dissatisfac-
tion with the judgment of the court appeal may be made to the court
of the overlord.1 7 The underlying operative principle is that the feudal
court is not one in which the judgments depend on either of the contest-
ants nor upon the caprice or self-interest of the lord, but rather, as the
law of the place is to be referred to the consent of the people at least
by reason of accepted practice, so too the maintenance of justice must
be removed from any independent show of power. The supremacy of
law is of course the first concern of the king. He must see to it that
no one is so great that he cannot be called before the king's court,
"pour defaute de droit ou pour faus jugement."'"
In our summary review of the feudal concepts of law and government
according to the Assizes, and the writings of Bracton and Beaumanoir,
we have observed that whatever was the peculiar structure of feudal-
ism the basic principles of the tradition of St. Augustine retained their
identity and even expanded. The bilateral contract of feudal tenure
was an outgrowth of the oath of coronation. The constitutional limita-
115. DI. BEAumAO, LES COUTumES DE BE:Auvoisus 263 (Bengnot's cd. 1842).
116. I id. at 39.
117. II id. at 456-8.
118. II id. at 22.
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tion that we discerned in the capitula of the Carolingian reign was in no
way weakened by the distinctive feudal principle of personal devotion
and fidelity to the lord. The contractual relations were reciprocal, bind-
ing upon both parties, on the lord as much as on the vassal. Feudalism
with its complex scheme of dependence and interdependence never con-
ceded to the armed superiority of autocratic authority. The principle of
justice underlying St. Isidore's "si rex eris" is embodied in the right to
disown allegiance or fief where submisson to duly administered justice is
denied. There is a growing insistence that no one be a judge in his own
cause and practical ways were devised for assuring an independent
judicial process. "There is no king where will rules and no law." "The
king is under God and the law." "La dame ne le sire n'en est seignor
se non dou droit." To the feudal lawyers the supremacy of justice meant
the supremacy of law. To them the conception of an arbitrary authority
was simply unthinkable. The distinction between the king who governs
according to the law and the tyrant who violates it was the clearest of
constitutional principles at a time of insufficiently developed consti-
tutional governments. Consent was not merely an approval nor a sheer
act of acceptance; nor is it a consent with any sort of reservation. Ii
the ruler was not legibus solutus in the sense we have explahted neither
was the community. If the consent of the community was required for
the promulgation of the law so was the consent of the ruler. This con-
ception of a pact as being not a contract between him who is a king and
the people but rather as a rudimentary sort of constitution which insti-
tutes governance and its conditions was to find fine philosophical expres-
sion, later on, in St. Thomas' representative government. The corona-
tion oaths, the election, custom law, the capitula, and the functions of
the missi-all presupposing the Christian moral law-could not but
make of authority a service for the good of the people. The chaotic
conditions of the tenth century could not uproot these principles from
the structure of medieval society, and the civil and religious conflicts
of the eleventh and twelfth century only sharpened the antithetical
principles underlying the Roman Imperium and the Christian auc-
toritas.
3. POLTICAL PMIOSOPHERS
a. John of Salisbury: "Higher Law"
Eight centuries after St. Augustine had given to the bewildered
Romans the Christian politeia for the regeneration of their Imperium,
John of Salisbury is the first Christian political philosopher to sum up
systematically the basic principles of the Christian tradition and to warn
his contemporaries of the necessity to preserve them if Christian society
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is to survive and prevail. In spite of the centrifugal forces of feudalism,
the central idea in John's political thought was strikingly progressive,--
that of a people ruled by a public authority for the common good whose
justification rests on its legitimacy. The notion of a common good was
no longer narrowly opposed to the personal, selfish interests of a ruler,
but gradually became commensurate with the dimensions of a territorial
kingdom. In England, the earliest concrete expression of a common good
was the extension of royal justice first by the inadequate expediency of
the king's peace and later by the royal and popular attack upon seignorial
justice to deprive it of its privileges and its franchises by means of royal
writs and especially, the Quo Warranto. Only then could royal justice
begin to assert a law that was common to all parts of the country and
to all classes of the community, and on the foundations of that common
law to construct a properly unified country. The elements of the com-
mon good comprehended by St. Isidore's objective content of custom law
was yet to be adequately evolved by St. Thomas Aquinas. This is the
time of transition and, in the ferment of events, principles and actuali-
ties exercise a mutually provocative influence. Extraordinary signifi-
cance is attached to his work because of his great learning, his wide and
intimate acquaintance with high ecclesiastical dignitaries and civil per-
sonages, and the immense popularity with which his book was received.
His Policraticus enjoyed in his day a great popularity as might be ex-
pected from the author's eminence in the religious world, which, in turn,
gave his work a wider influence. Its timeliness adds to its importance.
In a sense, John of Salisbury may be referred to as a modern because
there is but a faint trace of the terminology of feudalism in his Poli-
craticus.
"The Policraticus of John of Salisbury is the earliest elaborate medieval treatise
on politics. Completed in 1159, the date of its composition makes it a landmark in
the history of political speculation for two reasons. It is the only important politi-
cal treatise written before western thought had once more become familiar with the
Politics of Aristotle. It thus represents the purely medieval tradition unaffected by
ideas newly borrowed from classical antiquity. It is the culmination in their maturest
fbrn of a body of doctrines which had evolved in unbroken sequence from patristic
literature in contact with the institutions of the earlier middle ages. In the second
place it comes just before the important, turning point in the institutional develop-
ment at the end of the twelfth, and at the beginning of the thirteenth century, when
legal precision began to be stamped on a great number of previously indefinite rela-
tions and when feudal interdependence tended to become consolidated into definite
organs of political control. It therefore speaks from a point of view which was about
to disappear, but which it is all the more necessary to understand because it con-
tributed a heritage of ideas whose momentum made them, in spite of the newer
influences, the dominant force in political thought down to at least the middle of the
sixteenth century."11 9
119. THE STAmssmA's Boox or Joun or SAmsButY xvii (Dickenson's transl. 1927).
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The significance of the Policraticus is twofold: it sums up the sound
Christian tradition as being distinct and antithetical to pagan politeia, and
secondly, it was written with a deep realization of the need to remind
Christian society of the principles on which it rested and by which it
may endure. John of Salisbury recapitulates certain central notions of
St. Augustine's social theory, namely, the reasons for the existence of
society, the nature of social order, the source of civil justice in the
"higher law," and the distinguishing marks of a tyrant.
St. Augustine had said that the end and purpose of power is the hap-
piness of the citizens, which happiness is composed of three chief goods
-- order, union, and peace -.120 And this peace, the tranquillity of order,
is all comprehensive and enters deeply into the secrets of human experi-
ence. It must first begin in the individual rational soul in the harmony
of knowledge and action and then bring about as a consequence civil
peace. John of Salisbury affirmed the "security of life" (incolumitas
vitae) to be the end of the state and defined it as the "perception of
truth and the practice of virtue" and this, a moral end, the state can
attain when organized and directed by the highest equity (summae
aequitatis nutu). The salus publica must follow from the salus singu-
lorum et omnium; it is, in fact, the safety and weal of the individual
"writ large." He is the first one to derive a sound analogy of society
from the natural body."- For his position is a remarkably premature
rejection of individualism and laissez faire politics. A well-ordered Con-
stitution consists in the proper apportionment of functions to members
and in the apt condition, strength, and composition of each and every
member-all members must in their functions supplement and support
each other, never losing sight of the weal of the others, and feeling pain
in the harm that is done to another-the true unitas of the body of
the State rests on the just cohaerentia of the members among themselves
and with their head. This is no mere Platonic scheme of the individual
"writ large," To John of Salisbury, the community in terms of an or-
ganic structure appeared as a sort of a person with great possibilities for
goodness, not a Platonic functional order.
He is hardly concerned with a purely secular achievement in state-
craft. Like St. Augustine, John of Salisbury recognized that righteous-
ness cannot exist without true justice and the need in his day to refer all
governance to the "higher law" bore striking similarity to the times
of St. Augustine. Feudal relations were defined by specific stipulations
and jurisdictions had consolidated into definite organs of political con-
120. Co=Fs, LA DocTRnm OLIQuE DE SAINT AuGusTn" 105 (1927).
121. VAw GImRYx, POLITICA THEoums or TE AmD AcEs 24 (1927).
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trol. The importance and significance of positive law was generally
recognized and accepted. Furthermore, the Policraticus was written
between the years 1155 and 1159, during the papacy of Adrian IV,
and belonged therefore to the period when there was already some
friction between the Pope and the Emperor, and at a time when
John sensed the coming dispute between Henry II and his intimate friend
Thomas . Becket. "Every censure imposed by (positive) law is vain
if it does not bear the stamp of the divine law," and lest a prince think
that he has a peculiar prerogative to exercise private judgment in the in-
terpretation of the "higher law," John of Salisbury adds, " a statute
or ordinance of the prince is a thing of nought if not in conformity with
the teachings of the Church."' 22 At this point, John of Salisbury stands
between St. Augustine and St. Thomas. St. Augustine's eternal law pro-
vided the true idea of objective justice, antecedent to human positive
law, towards which Civil Society must tend as an end. John of Salisbury
found in the "higher law" the purpose of society to be the "common
good," which St. Thomas was to discern in the natural law and in the
more enlarged meaning of the natural means of man's perfectibility.
We can identify two distinct elements in John of Salisbury's common
good; first, impartial justice on the principle that men have equal
rights to what is their due according to the law; secondly, Beaumanoir's
"common interest" is enlarged to mean the "advantage of the common-
wealth."'" These two objectives distinguish the true king from the
tyrant, who, he recognizes, rules in accordance with Roman law prin-
ciples.
"However it is said that the prince is absolved from the obligations of the law;
but this is not true in the sense that it is lawful for him to do unjust acts, but only
in the sense that his character should be such as to cause him to practice equity not
through fear of the penalties of the law but through love of justice; and should
also be such as to cause him from the same motive to promote the advantage of
the commonwealth, and in all things to prefer the good of others before his own
private will. Who, indeed, in respect of public matters can properly speak of the will
of the prince at all, since therein he may not lawfully have any will of the prince
apart from that law or equity enjoins, or the calculation of the common interest
requires: For in these matters his will is to have the force of a judgment; and most
properly that which pleases him therein has the force of law, because his decision
may not be at variance with the intention of equity."' 24
122. STATESmA." 24-5.
123. STAThESmAq 6: "Now equity, as the learned jurists define it, is a certain fitness
of things which compares all things rationally, and seeks to apply like rules of right and
wrong to like cases, being impartially disposed toward all persons, and allotting to each
that which belongs to him. Of this equity the interpreter is the law, to which the will
and intention of equity and justice are known." (Italics mine).
124. Id. at 5.
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John of Salisbury's ethical and legal emendation of the lex regis was
made with evident alarm at the return of Roman law in the imperial
courts.
"Now there are certain precepts of law which have a perpetual necessity, ha ing
the force of law among nations, and which absolutely cannot be broken with im-
punity. . .. Ldt the whitewashers of rulers ... trumpet abroad that the prince is
not subject to the law, and that whatsoever is his -ill and pleasure, not merely hs
establishing law according to the model of equity, but absolutely and free from all
restrictions, has the force of law.... Still I will maintain ... that kings are bound
by this law."'92
This central idea of law, as supreme over king and subjects is based no
longer on its origin in the consent of equals, solely, but also on its positive
ordination to the common good. In this enlarged sense, the king as ad-
ministrator of the law, is the "representative of the commonwealth," the
"minister of the common interest... and bears the public person." He
is an "officer," and his acts are not his own, but those of the "univer-
sitas" or corporate community in whose place he stands. The king, who
withdraws "from the obligations of the law" not only ceases to be king
but becomes an "outlaw."'21 -2 Of John of Salisbury's doctrine of tyranni-
cide we can only observe that it deviates from the normal development
of the tradition of Augustine and from the normal doctrine of his times.
He based his doctrine of tyrannicide on the conception that a private
individual may lawfully act to enforce "the law" against a tyrannical or
"outlaw" ruler. What later thought brought out was that law can be
enforced only by an agent holding a legitimate mandate from the com-
munity. The emphasis in the Policraticus seems to be that the com-
munity is summed up somehow in the ruler-and this leads Salisbury to
think that the community, or universitas, could not act except through
the prince. Hence if action was to be taken against him, it had to be
taken as private individual action. But what he did not perceive is that
to vest the right of tyrannicide in a subject would be to make the sub-
ject the legitimate judge of his ruler; and a legitimate judge, even the
king himself, may not condemn an accused person without summons,
trial and conviction. Certainly no mere individual can have greater
authority over one not lawfully subject to him than a king has over
his subjects.
b. St. Thomas Aquinas: "The Christian LEX REGIA"
Had St. Thomas' political philosophy been accorded on the Continent
a "reception" of its own, Roman law may not have revived so success-
125. STATESmXAN 33 et seq.
126. Id. at 34.
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fully as it did, since he lived at a very opportune time in the develop-
ment of political doctrine. He was the first to rescue Aristotle from
the Arabian philosophers and adapt him to the truths which Christianity
attained through reason and revelation. Further, one of his distinctive
contributions was to define the independent domain of philosophy and
to vindicate for human reason an autonomy commensurate with its
natural finality. The intelligibility of the actual and the power of the
mind to discern the inner meaning of reality and the intriiisic demands
of being made possible the Thomistic adequate concept of human
nature as that of a rational, moral, social, and political animal. St.
Thomas supplied the necessary correctives to St. Augustine's social
theory by an adequate concept of sound human nature. Aristotle for
want of the specific equality of men saw no essential social relationships
and could evolve an idea solely of the "political" man. St. Augustine,
engaged in the Roman milieu where there was no genuine political man
(and wanting an adequate metaphysics), emphasized only the social
man. St. Thomas formed the theory fitting both the political and
social nature of man from the essential dynamism of human nature
and from the scope of divine providence in society.127
127. A very curious observation about the teaching of St. Thomas is that, while he
uses Aristotle and the Roman Stoic Cicero without it being apparent that he is aware
of their naturalism, he interprets them in such a way as to give the necessary distinctions
corrective of Stoicism. For in St. Thomas' natural law doctrine we have an adequate
answer to the blurred and confused identifications that plagued the philosophic thought
of antiquity. St. Thomas distinguishes between the eternal law, the natural law, the
divine law, and human law. (I, II, 90 et seq). It is manifest, he says, that the whole
universe is governed by the divine reason, and therefore this "ratio gubernationis" has
the character of law, for law is reason directing things to their end. All things which
are subject to the divine providence are controlled by the eternal law by participating
somehow in the eternal law; (I, U, 91, 2) but the rational creature is subject to the
divine providence in a more excellent way, for it shares in the work of providence, it
"provides" for itself and others, and this participation of the rational creature in the
eternal law is called natural law. Whether or not St. Thomas was cognizant of the
doctrine of the Stoics, he distinguished correctly between the natural law in the sense
of nature which man has in common with all animals and that natural law by which
man is differentiated from irrational creatures. Thus Ulpian's "jus naturae est quod
natura omnia animalia docuit" is repeated verbatim by St. Thomas, prefaced by the
correct specification: "Secundo, inest homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia secundum
naturam, in qua communicat cum ceteris animalibus et secundum hoc dicuntur ea esso
de lege naturali, quae natura otnnia animalia docuit." (191, I, II, 94, 2). The same
emendation occurs when he discusses positive law. Men can, by a common agreement,
establish a law as just, in matters otherwise indifferent, as long as it is not contrary
to natural justice, and this is positive law. (II, II, 57, 2). He adverts to the definition
of justice as embodied in this positive law given by Ulpian in the Digest "Justitla est
constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi." And remarks that it is to be
understood in the light of his whole discussion. Respondeo dicendum, quod predicta
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For our present purpose, we will confine our study to St. Thomas'
sound version of the lex regia since it comprehends many important
implicates for constitutional supremacy through the agency of representa-
tive government. Is the transfer of authority by the people to the
ruler revocable or irrevocable? Is the transfer made conditionally
or absolutely, and what is the manner by which it takes place? The
answers to these questions distinguish St. Thomas' lex regia from the
Roman original which the Bolognese legists were restoring in the
courts of national princes and overweening emperors.
In the Summa, St. Thomas states his preference for the mixed form
of government in which governance is "shared by all because all are
eligible to govern, and because the rulers are chosen by all." This gen-
eral participation in government is of course not the Greek egalitarian
sort but a participation in different degrees and in different ways. The
"head" is given the power to preside over all; "a number of persons"
are set in authority under him, and these rulers (men invested with gov-
erning powers) can be chosen from the people and by the people because
"the people have the right to choose their rders." The choice of rulers,
as such, by the people may mean no more than mere designation. Since
St. Thomas is expressing a preference it follows (as well as from other
reasons) that both the form of government and the choice of the rulers
are of human origin.
In St. Thomas' reasons for the deposition of a tyrant, we enter inti-
mately into his meaning of "choice by the people." A tyrant is a ruler
who ignores the common good of the community, the raison d'etre for
that office. And since St. Thomas teaches that the people can take
action against the tyrant "not through the private presumption of a few
just'tiae definitio conveniens est, si recte inteUigatur. (I1, II, 58, 1). In giving an ob-
jective norm to the subjective content of justice, the question still remains how does
the mind attain to the objective. St. Thomas resolves the Stoic antimony between
the Cosmic Reason and human conduct by distinguishing between two orders of nature
and their essentially different necessities, physical and moral, and their relation to the
human intelligence as an active potency.
"Human reason is not of itself the rule of things. But the principles impressed on it
by nature are general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof
the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things
that are from nature." (I, II, 91, 3).
128. Id. at I, II, 105, 1. The significance of this passage lies in the fact that it was
written at a time when the French and English monarchs were finally succeeding in
making the crown hereditary in their families through the practice of securing the election
and coronation of the heir during the lifetime of his predecessor. St. Thomas was




but by public authority,"'nit follows that the choice by the people im-
plied transfer of authority that is conditional and revocable. This choice
is, therefore, more than an election; it is a consent to government ac-
cording to a "covenant," "a kind of pact." And it is in: the nature of
this pact that the powers of the rulers are such as are given them and
according to the terms of the pact as well as the essential moral objec-
tives of the exercise of civil power. The tyrant is "guilty of sedition"1 '
because he has converted the power given him to his own personal advan-
tage and interest. The legitimacy of public action against the tyrant
arises not only from the terms of the contract but also from its moral
nature. According to St. Thomas' notion of the pact, the ruler is chosen
to rule in place of the people and in the name of the people for their
common good. Failing in his representative character there is no basis
for his kingship. Since the authority of the king is the authority of the
community the people can revoke the power given him when he is
faithless to his trust. Since then the power delegated is conditional and
revocable by "public authority," there is some power vested in the very
nature of civil society which is inalienable and which no contract can
void.
If the legitimacy of action against a tyrant rests on the nature of a
pact, its justice is based on the nature of the common good, which is the
immediate objective of society and of the ruler who acts in its name and
for its sake. "To order anything to the common good belongs either to
the people, or to someone who is the vice-gerent of the whole people."
Since law "regards first and foremost the order to the common good" 11
it follows that "the making of law belongs either to the people or the
public personage who has the care of the whole people." St. Thomas'
doctrine of law distinguishes the representative character of his legis-
lator from the Roman who possessed the plenitude of legislative power.
The people indeed can judge what is an ordination to the common good
and are therefore competent to judge tyranny. And in the ordination
of law to the common good, St. Thomas finds another reason more basic
than consent itself for the supremacy of law. The Prince is not legibws
solutus but must obey his own laws which he, the vice-gerent of the
people, legislates for their common good.132 This is the reason under-
lying the position he maintains together with St. Augustine and St.
Isidore that a custom of the people has the force of law to invalidate
129. PnELAN, ON THE GOVERNANCE OF RULERS C. VI (1938).
130. SUMMA THEOLOGICA HI, II, 42, 1.
131. Id. at I, II, 90, 3.
132. Id. at I, II, 90, 3; I, II, 96, 5.
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some contrary law of a ruler.133 Law is the expression of the reason and
will of the legislator, but these are declared as plainly by men's actions
as by their words, and therefore the frequently repeated actions of men
which constitute custom can change or establish or interpret law. This
concept of the legislative power as being basically popular and in no way
the exclusive prerogative of the ruler is strikingly antithetical to the
Roman Imperium.
St. Thomas counsels that authority be so restrained (temperatur) that
the ruler can not easily fall into tyranny.134 What these restraints are
133. Id. at I, 11, 97, 3.
134. PHnx.N, op. cit. supra note 129, at 1, 6. This form of constraint is through
law and institutions. St. Thomas' treatment of the representative principle, of the elective
method of creating this representation, of the distribution of power, and its administration
according to the terms of a pact comes very near to the contemporary constitutional
development and provides basic principles for its advance. Yet Professor McIlwain holds
to the contrary. McIwA3N, THE GRovz oF PoLnicAL THouGHT iNi Tim Wxsr 330
(1932). The misunderstanding of St. Thomas by Professor Afcllwain can only be in-
telligible by his failure to distinguish between principles of Constitutional government
and Constitutional institutions. Further, for reasons which we cannot discuss at length
here, Professor McIlwain finds the growth of constitutional government in the revival
of Roman law and in the breakdown of Christendom (cf. AlcILwA=, Co.sTrrUxo:AMS-ar,
ANwCINT AND MODEM (1947). And in his entire section on St. Thomas ("The Growth")
he makes no reference to the evaluation of St. Thomas given by Carlyle in his monumental
work. In spite of the evidence that St. Thomas stressed the representative function of
princes ("gerunt vicem Dei et communitatis", Su rA THEoLcOcA II, II, 63, 3), of the
election of the ruler by the people with the sole exception of his designation by a superior
in the feudal system (DE REG. PRn. 1, 1), of the distribution of power among a "number
of persons" who "are set in authority" most likely by the ruler who "is given the power
to preside over all" (1, 11, 105, 1) and who is "chosen" by the people who have the
right to choose their rulers" (1, II, 105, 1), of St. Thomas' cognizance of limited monarchy
attempted in antiquity (Co mENTARY ON AnisToTLs's Porz'rcs 1, 1, potestatem coarcta-
tem. secundum aliquas leges civitatis . . . secundum leges positas per disciplinan politicam,
as distinct from absolute power, plenarium potestatem-plenarium not arbitrariam. Mc-
Ulwain is aware of this, n. 1, 330) of St. Thomas' own dear preference for a mixed con-
stitution (est enim aliquod regimen ex istis commistum, quad est optimum, 1, 11, 95, 4)
in which, quoting St. Isidore (ErTaoLorizs v. 10) laws are made by the "majores natu
cum plebibus," of the extraordinary constitutional significance of his teachings of the
deposition of the tyrant by Public Authority according to the pactum (DE REo. Pra.. 1, 6),
namely that the laws are supreme not only over the ruler but also supreme against any
private presumptions or any mob action (si ad jus multitudinis alicuius pertineat, sibi pro-
videre de rege), for here Thomas is teaching in different words "due process" and "equal
protection before the law," Professor Mcflwain can still say: 'His (St. Thomas') preference
seems to be for a pure monarchy in which the king is 'absolute.' Removal of a tyrant
by private men St. Thomas condemns, but chiefly on the grounds of expediency." This
shows how poorly McIlwain appreciates first the supremacy of law over any individual
private action implied in St. Thomas' teaching but also the full meaning of the common
good in the light of which and for whose sake any private or public act on a public matter
must be measured both for its legitimacy and its justice. Even in our own American Con-
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do not appear in the De Regimine Principum which unfortunately he
did not complete himself. But from the parallel discussion in the Summa
Theologica St. Thomas states that in order to achieve St. Augustine's
pax (to which he alludes) all should have some share in the government
"for this form of government ensures peace among the people, com-
mends itself to all, and is more enduring."
The modernity of St. Thomas Aquinas has been controversialas among
contemporary scholars of constitutional history. St. Thomas' mixed polity
stitutional tradition, court decisions have negatived such private actions as illegal because
of the proximate danger to the government, which would in safer circumstances bo al-
lowed by the law itself and by the courts. The sole exception to the deposition of a tyrant
by the people-namely the recourse to some superior authority in the feudal system (Dz
REG. PRIN. 1, 6) is considered by Mclwain as the normal practice of the times and the
action by the "public authority" as the exception. This discloses the root of Mcliwan's
misunderstanding. St. Thomas is not giving us a record of what is, merely, but teaching
a doctrine which is ahead of its times-and at a time when the transition from the feudal
structure of society to the national unit was gradually taking place. 5 CARLxLz, op. cil.
supra note 8, at 97. It is clear that his (Thomas') conception of a good constitution is that
of a monarchy limited by the authority of an aristocracy elected by and representative of
the community.
135. MAx ADAS SHwE mAa, Theory of Sir John Fortescue in ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND
PoLiicAL THEORY IN RONOR OF CHARLES HowARD Mc1LwAzi 308-9 (1936): "Such a gov-
ernment (dominiumr regale et politicum), in which the king be he elective or hereditary,
is limited by the customary law of the land as well as by natural and divine law, was
well known to Aquinas. The famous philosopher specifically states that in a free multitude
(which we interpret as being his mixed government) 'the prince has no authority of legis-
lating, except insofar as he bears the person of the multitude,' and that in such a state the
whole people may enact law. Aquinas perhaps did not work out, as definitely as did For-
tescue, the idea of a constitutional participation of specific representative organs In the
process of legislation and administration. Nevertheless, the general idea of a mixed govern-
ment, in which the king is limited by the customary law of the land in the making of
which the community-at-large has an important part, certainly occurs in Aquinas. Indeed,
we believe that St. Thomas favored this mixed government over the royal or despotic type.
Admittedly, however, this point is a dubious one, and Professor McIlwain adopts a con-
trary interpretation. But in any event it would appear that Fortescue had some grounds
for saying that he found an important precedent for his mixed government in the dominiuan
regale et politicum of Aquinas. It is true that Fortescue cites the first book of Aquinas'
De Regimine Prncipum rather than the stronger passages in the Summa Theologica. Still,
the conception of a mixed monarchy, limited not only by natural and divine law, but also
by a customary law (sometimes called jus gentium) and by the principle that 'what
touches all should be approved by all,' was as much a general medieval one as a peculiarly
English one. Custom was a compelling limit on all authority throughout the Middle Agcs,
and many thinkers seem, often hazily no doubt, to have recognized this. Its greatest
defect was lack of specific sanctions and specific organs of government to act as checks and
balances. Fortescue did something to clarify the conception and to establish specific organs
to check royal tyranny. But with him, as with many previous medieval thinkers, the sanc-
tion inherent in the custom itself, and in the habits of obedience it implies, is still the
predominant one."
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in which the sovereign is limited by the law of the realm in the making
of which the community at large has an important part and in whose
administration the popularly designated representatives constitute a ru-
dimentary sort of institutional check on arbitrary power, was histori-
cally the most opportune, though, as events bore out, premature, con-
summation of the logic inherent in medieval constitutionalism. It is at
the same time a most remarkable testimonial to St. Thomas' profound
penetration to the meaning underlying the quickened dissolution of
feudalism and the emergence of the territorial national state. In a sub-
sequent article, we will trace the fruition of medieval constitutionalism
in England and ascertain to what extent it was contingent upon the in-
stitutional fixing of the Catholic polity in that country by her jurists and
what measure of influence the ecclesiastical models of representative
governance, viz., the Dominikan Convocations--exerted upon the origin
of the English Parliaments.
In this present study, we have limited our selection of historical in-
dices to such as are illustrative of successive progressions in the evolu-
tion of the ethico-juridic attributes of medieval constitutionalism. St.
Augustine was the first of the Fathers of the Church to apply to the
political-juridical order doctrines of the Christian Revelation.U0 He
founded the principle of consent for governance on the specific equality of
men and by conjoining it to the Pauline dictum, "all power is from God,"
he provided an adequate basis for the title to command fellow-equals
while at the same time he thereby delimited the objectives and claims of
the Politeia in the light of man's transcendental destiny. Furthermore,
by his doctrine of the eternal law, as the divine examplar of a freely
created universe, St. Augustine broke through the all inclusive and self-
enclosed monistic naturalism of the ancients. He could thereupon vindi-
cate the necessity of a human law, truly temporal and variable and, as a
corollary, deduce the salutarf-distinction between legitimacy and justice,
and so resolve the pagan antinomy between phmnsis and nomos. St.
Isidore enlarged upon the material constituents of positive law as the
reasonable presuppositions of choice and thereby conferred upon custom
law those prerogative attributes which later legal development ascribed
to prescriptive rights, franchises, immunities, and fundamental liberties.
Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, posited the supremacy and binding
force of positive law on the juridic title of "general promulgation and
consent." The earliest Christian construct of law and governance is the
Law of The Visigoths. Predominantly the work of the bishops of the
Councils of Toledo under the guiding influence of St. Isidore, the Law
136. CocmtuA", Cmmsmu AND CLASSICAL CuLTuRE (1944).
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of the Visigoths was essentially a translation of ethico-religious princi-
ples of public and private law into a legal code and a deliberate emen-
dation of the Roman lex regia and patria potestas. The Carolingian
Capitularia operated as a rudimentary form of constitutionalism by con-
ditioning the fealty of the people to each successive ruler upon his faith-
ful observance of the "law of our predecessors." The inviolability of
these laws from unilateral change or abrogation rested upon the communi
consilio et consensu of their origin and consequently provided the only
legitimate grounds for amendment and emendation. The growing ap-
preciation of the supremacy of law as derived from the more enlarged
juridic implicates of consent was greatly corroborated by the bilateral
nature of the feudal contract. The deferential allegiance of imperial
Rome is replaced by a personal devotion of mutually contingent rights,
obligations, and services. Treason is infidelitas not laesa maiestas. The
legislative sovereignty inherent in the Imperium could not find a place
in the political tradition of a Christian customary law when the sov-
ereign powers of an evolving regnum were interpretative and judicial.
The Assizes of Jerusalem attest to the increased recognition of the neces-
sity of institutional securities for constitutional supremacy. By establish-
ing procedures of impartial adjudication on the canon law principle that
no man is to be a judge in his own cause and by devising a system of
appeal within the feudal hierarchy they 'contributed to the achieve-
ment characteristic of Christian medieval polity-the inalienable right
to immunity from the arbitrary. Later-day positive legal provisions, such
as "due process," "equal protection," and trial by peers may properly
be considered as logical and historical developments of the medieval em-
bodiments of St. Augustine's principles of equality and consent. John of
Salisbury warned his generation against the deceptive pretensions of a
renascent Romanism and he recapitulated for his contemporaries the
Christian political heritage which had evolved in unbroken sequence
from patristic literature. The Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis served to.
complement and remedy the deficiencies of the pagan politeia137 and of
the Augustinian tradition. St. Thomas formulated a mixed polity by a
scheme of duly elected governors-representative officers-for the ad-
137. With Plato and Aristotle, a rational Theory of the State came to light in Greek
philosophy. They were the first to conceive of the City-State as an association of citizens
bound together by common values and interests integrated by law (The Constitution) for
the prosecution of a general welfare which they conceived as essentially ordained to tho
happiness of its members. The failure of the polifeha was consequent to the flaws Inherent
in Greek inteliectionalism which conduced to all the captive restraints of a self-enclosed
naturalism. See Costanzo, Graeco-Roman Polite a, 20 FORDAmm LAw REv. (1951).
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ministration of civil justice according to the law of the land in the
making of which the people at large had a great share and determination.
In the next article, we will survey the development of medieval con-
stitutionalism in Catholic England and the reasons for its triumphant
survival after the schism. Correlative to this study we will seek out
some reasons for the paradox of centuries, namely-the loss of the
Catholic political heritage in Catholic Continental countries and their
surrender to Romanism.
